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Abstract
In the Summer of 1864, Confederate General Robert E. Lee tasked Major General
Jubal Early to protect the Army of Northern Virginia’s rear by defending the strategically
vital Shenandoah Valley from Union conquest. By the Fall, Early was losing decisively,
hopelessly outnumbered, and making no strategic refinements. He never seriously
attempted to synchronize his Valley operations with Colonel John S. Mosby’s nearby 43rd
Ranger Battalion, despite ominous reversals and Mosby’s attempts to cooperate.
Mosby was a gifted tactician who patterned his actions after his revolutionary
hero, Brigadier General Francis Marion. He achieved his dream of being a “partisan” like
Marion by organizing and leading Virginians behind enemy lines in hit-and-run raids
against the Bluecoats. Like Early, the Patriot Major General Nathanael Greene had been
significantly outmatched in the Carolinas in 1780. He had turned the tables on the British
with a plan that combined European-style pitched battles with guerilla raids.
Greene strategically defeated Major General Charles Cornwallis’ Redcoats in
1781 by providing partisans like Marion with clear direction and a sense of purpose. He
recognized Marion’s skill and provided him with written orders to provide intelligence,
attack supply lines, and suppress Loyalists. By contrast, Early never nested Mosby’s
Rangers into his operations, even when defeat appeared obvious. Greene had created
opportunities with a spirit of humility and cooperation in 1780; in 1864, Early denied
Mosby’s nearby Rangers any real opportunities to effectively influence his forlorn
conventional strategy against Major General Phillip Sheridan’s vastly larger army.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
“Guerilla warfare” is integral to world and US military history. Military theorist
Max Boot describes “guerilla,” or “irregular” warfare as “hit-and-run tactics by an armed
group directed primarily against a government and its security forces for political or
religious reasons.” The term “guerilla” originated from Spain’s “petite guerre,” or small
war (1808-1814) against Napoleon’s army. Patriot Brigadier General Francis Marion and
Confederate Colonel John S. Mosby perfected guerilla warfare during the American
Revolution (1775-1783) and Civil War (1861-1865). They were “partisans”—officiallysanctioned officers who assisted regular armies by organizing and leading local
inhabitants in attacks against the flanks and rear of enemy armies. As “partisans” they
optimized “asymmetric tactics”—attacks calculated for maximum “political and
informational impact” with the lowest possible risk for the insurgents. Their vastly
outmatched rebel governments adopted “hybrid strategies” that combined conventional
and asymmetric warfare to compensate for material inferiority. Their political and
military leaders, however, reflected different societies and national goals. Most historians
agree that the Confederacy’s unbending dedication to the status quo was fundamentally
less democratic than the Patriots’ “Whig” ideology. 1 A divergence of ideological goals
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Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A Military History of
the United States of America (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 58; Andrew J. Birtle,
U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860-1941
(Washington: Center of Military History, 1998), 23; Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, trans.
Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 479-483;
Walter Laqueur, Guerilla Warfare: A Historical and Critical Study (New Brunswick and
London: Transaction Publishers, 1998), xvi-xvii; In Invisible Armies: An Epic History of
Guerilla Warfare From Ancient Times to the Present (New York: Liveright Publishing
Corporation, 2013), 78; During the American Revolution, “Whig” became synonymous
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partially explains why Patriot Major General Nathanael Greene embraced partisan
warfare during his 1780 Southern Campaign, while Confederate Major General Jubal
Early avoided unconventional tactics in Northern Virginia in 1864. Greene and Early
both lacked experience as independent commanders, but Early’s choices clearly reflected
more conservative ideals. Greene was more willing to pursue a hybrid strategy and
proactively coordinate his efforts with available partisans. Was Greene more realistic
than Early? Might Greene’s example have been instructive to Early? Could Early have
succeeded by using every available option, including Mosby’s command?
Primary accounts from prominent Whig participants of the Southern Campaign
elucidate Marion’s importance to the success of Greene’s hybrid strategy. There are a
number of excellent primary accounts concerning the guerilla war in the South. Greene’s
Papers are a compilation of his letters, reports, and war correspondence that cover his
leadership and cooperation with Marion and other partisans. William Dobein James’ A
Sketch of the Life of Brig. Gen. Francis Marion and a History of His Brigade (1821) is
the only complete primary account of Marion’s Brigade from a partisan who joined
Marion at the age of fifteen. While James’ timeline is occasionally confused, his narrative
combines his own eyewitness accounts and fellow soldiers’ reminiscences. General
Henry “Lighthorse Harry” Lee’s Memoirs provide an account of Marion’s operations
from one of the war’s most competent leaders. Lee describes his cooperation with
Marion, including raids, strategic choices, tactics, and his own assessment of Marion. The
Papers of South Carolina Governor John Rutledge, Henry Laurens, William Davie, and

with “Patriot,” while “Tory” became synonymous with “Loyalism,” or loyalty to Great
Britain.
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James Iredell contextualize the southern war and the impact of Marion’s actions. General
Peter Horry, Marion’s cavalry commander, wrote “transcripts” for the novelist Mason
Locke “Parson” Weems for an early-nineteenth-century biography of Marion. Although
Weems’ subsequent work is of little historical value, Horry’s transcripts provide detailed
accounts of Marion’s guerilla raids. The Documentary History of the American
Revolution, William Gibbes, ed., also provides much of Marion’s war correspondence.
Unwearied Patience and Fortitude: Francis Marion’s Orderly Book, Patrick O’Kelley,
ed., provides invaluable information and commentaries on Marion’s command
philosophy, discipline, and operations. General William Moultrie and the Whig politician
Dr. David Ramsay’s American Revolutionary narratives additionally provide excellent
background that highlight Marion’s major contributions.
Primary British actors provide a contrastingly negative account of Marion’s
Brigade. The Cornwallis Papers: The Campaigns of 1780 and 1781 in The Southern
Theatre of the American Revolutionary War, Ian Saberton ed., is a compilation of the
correspondence of British General Lord Charles Cornwallis, who commanded British
forces during the entire Southern Campaign. Cornwallis’ Papers span from the opening
of the Siege of Charleston on April 1, 1780, to his surrender at Yorktown on October 19,
1781. His military correspondence dramatically recounts how Marion’s attacks on
Loyalists, outposts, and supply lines ground British operations to a halt. Other key British
sources include post-war histories authored by General Banastre Tarleton, Cornwallis’
cavalry commander; General Henry Clinton, the overall North American British
commander and architect of the Southern Campaign; and Charles Stedman, Cornwallis’
commissary general. The Memoirs of southern Loyalists like Alexander Chesney and
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Roger Lamb describe how Revolutionary irregular militia gained the upper hand in the
partisan war. Loyalist articles and editorials in the Royal Gazette (Charleston, S.C.),
South Carolina and American General Gazette, and the South Carolina Gazette and
American Journal, demonstrate crown supporters’ use of print media as
counterpropaganda to the political impact of Marion’s raids. British newspapers like the
London Gazette, as well as the Memoirs and Correspondence of Royal officials
illuminate the partisans’ influence on domestic war support.2
Mosby’s success created a similar polarity of primary supporters and detractors.
Confederate sources generally herald Mosby as a southern hero and symbol of defiance.
The Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (OR) contains the most
important correspondence between General Robert E. Lee and his subordinate
commanders, including Mosby. The OR details the extent of Mosby’s cooperation with
Generals Lee and James Ewell Brown (JEB) Stuart, the impact of his raids, and the
strategic relevance of guerilla warfare. Major Generals Jubal Early and John B. Gordon’s
Memoirs provide useful information on Confederate strategic decisions and
developments during the Shenandoah Valley Campaigns of 1864, as well as Early’s
strategic thinking and decision not to utilize asymmetric warfare. Mosby’s Papers are at
several locations, including the University of Virginia, the Virginia Historical Society,
and the Library of Congress. They contain Mosby’s personal and military correspondence
before, during, and after the war. The Letters of John S. Mosby, edited by Adele H.
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Edmund Burke, The Correspondence of Edmund Burke, vol. 4, John A. Woods, ed.
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1963), 266-270, 382-390; Horace Walpole,
The Last Journals of Horace Walpole, vol. 2, A. Francis Steuart, ed., 2nd ed. (New York:
John Lane Company, 1910), 319-340; The London Gazette, 1780-1781.
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Mitchell, provides important details on the creation of Mosby’s command, Lee and
Stuart’s perception of partisans, and the Berryville Wagon Raid. Mosby’s War
Reminiscences and Stuart’s Cavalry Campaigns (1887), Stuart’s Cavalry in the
Gettysburg Campaign (1908), and The Memoirs of Colonel John S. Mosby (1917) are
Mosby’s essential reflections and reminiscences of his contribution to the war.
Reminiscences focuses on his guerilla raids until June 1863; Stuart’s Cavalry covers his
reconnaissance for Stuart prior to the battle of Gettysburg; Memoirs recounts his early
life, enlistment, and details about his Valley exploits against Sheridan. Former Rangers
including John Scott, John M. Crawford, John W. Munson, and John Alexander also
wrote important Memoirs and Reminiscences that describe the aggressive operations and
proliferation of Mosby’s 43rd Ranger Battalion throughout 1864. The Diaries of the war
clerk JB Jones and the aristocrat Mary Boykin Chesnutt provide essential Confederate
political commentaries regarding major strategic developments.
Northern sources underscore Mosby’s destructive impact on Union war aims.
General Ulysses S. Grant and Major General Phillip Sheridan’s OR correspondence
reveal how Mosby’s raids disrupted Sheridan’s Valley strategy, and what counter-guerilla
operations he ultimately implemented. Grant and Sheridan’s Memoirs additionally
provide general, if somewhat whitewashed accounts of Federal counterinsurgency efforts
throughout Northern Virginia that omit details about their controversial retaliatory
summary executions of guerillas. Hundreds of newspapers on both sides of the divide,
but especially in New York and Richmond, amplify the political and informational
impact of Mosby’s raids in the North and South. Eyewitness Union accounts that testify
to the tactical élan and psychological dominance of Mosby’s Rangers include Frederic
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Denison’s Sabres and Spurs: The First Regiment Rhode Island Cavalry in the Civil War,
1861-1865 (1876), and Thomas W. Smith’s The Story of a Cavalry Regiment:“Scott’s
900,” Eleventh New York Cavalry (1897). The Diaries of Union Secretary of the Navy
Gideon Welles and the attorney George Templeton Strong provide excellent insight into
the war’s political impact on northern voters, as well as how the newspapers’ coverage of
Union failures negatively affected Union morale. Like Marion, Mosby’s asymmetric
raids exploited sensational press coverage and enemy hysteria to build an aura of
invincibility that inspired and symbolized rebel resistance, while creating irrational fear
and hatred among enemies. Their success in using their regional talents, resources,
tactical skills, and surprise and fear as force multipliers, all originate from ancient
guerilla warfare principles.
Classic and modern military treatises, guerilla histories, and counterinsurgency
manuals help to explain why Marion and Mosby’s campaigns were so effective. Carl Von
Clausewitz’s On War (1832) provides excellent information on guerilla warfare theory.
John Ellis’ A Short History of Guerilla Warfare (1976) provides a useful overview of
irregular warfare from ancient to modern times. Walter Laqueur’s Guerilla Warfare: A
Historical and Critical Study (1998) is an international narrative of guerilla warfare and
insurgent theory throughout history with irregular warfare case studies, leaders, and their
theories from ancient to modern times. Max Boot’s Invisible Armies: An Epic History of
Guerilla Warfare From Ancient Times to the Present (2013) is another global history that
provides vignettes of asymmetric warfare from biblical times to the present. Ian Beckett’s
Encyclopedia of Guerilla Warfare (1999) is a reference work that provides encyclopedic
summaries of guerilla leaders, techniques, and campaigns. Andrew J. Birtle’s U.S. Army
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Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860-1941 (1998) is a history
of the evolution of American counterinsurgency doctrine and tactics from the Civil War
to World War II. Birtle argues that principles transcend the evolution of insurgency and
counterinsurgency, and provides an excellent strategic overview of Federal
counterinsurgency policy and execution pertaining to Mosby’s area of operations. Archer
Jones’ The Art of War in the Western World (1987) explains how guerilla warfare fits
within larger strategy. Finally, The U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency
Field Manual (2007), edited by Conrad Crane, is useful for defining modern guerilla,
insurgent, and terrorist terms and theories.
Francis Marion (1732-1795) was no terrorist. As a Continental officer, he led a
guerilla force varying between sixteen and 1000 men in a campaign against enemy
supply lines that upended British control of eastern South Carolina between August 1780
and September 1781. Tradition has it that he became known as the “Swamp Fox” when
British Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton allegedly said “as for this damned old fox,
the Devil himself could not catch him.”3 General Peter Horry unwittingly enabled the
novelist Mason Locke “Parson” Weems to produce a mythologized neoclassical-style
biography that portrayed him as the knightly “Washington of the South” in the earlynineteenth-century. William Gilmore Simms’ subsequent biography only perpetuated
Marion’s “knight in shining armor” legend spawned by Weems. Military historian Don
Higginbotham points out that US military history of the later “Progressive-era” was

The “Low Country” describes the coastal wetland region of swamps, marshes, and
interlocking creeks and rivers that roughly spans from Wilmington, N.C. in the north, to
the Georgia sea-islands in the south, and inland roughly sixty miles; Hugh F. Rankin,
Francis Marion: The Swamp Fox (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1973), 113.
3
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dominated by soldier-historians who disparaged militia as unruly farmers. Post-World
War II Revolutionary War monographs, however, provided increasingly objective
analyses of partisan exploits, and in 1973 historian Hugh F. Rankin’s Francis Marion:
The Swamp Fox became Marion’s first professional biography. Rankin argued that
Marion’s life was “like a sandwich—a highly spiced center between two slabs of rather
dry bread,” and that he was “a natural partisan leader and was able to utilize a relatively
small striking force to its greatest potential—his primary weapon was the element of
surprise.” His overall positive account conceded that the ruthless Swamp Fox was no
“knight in shining armor.”4 Rankin and other post-World War II historians acknowledge
irregular militia’s importance. While historians like Wayne Lee blame the militia’s poor
organizational structure for the South’s violent war of reprisals, none deny that
Continental military success was enabled by cooperative partisans.5

4

Peter Horry and M.L. Weems, The Life of General Francis Marion (Philadelphia: J.B.
Lippincott & Co., 1857), v; William G. Simms, The Partisan: A Romance of the
Revolution. 2nd ed. (New York: Redfield, 1854), 45-46; Don Higginbotham, The War of
American Independence: Military Attitudes, Policies, and Practice, 1763-1789 (New
York: MacMillan, 1971), 360-369; Christopher Ward, The War of the Revolution (New
York: The Macmillan Company, 1952); Piers Mackesy, The War for America, 1775-1783
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964); Rankin, Francis Marion, ix, 298-299.
5
See John Oller, The Swamp Fox: How Francis Marion Saved the American Revolution
(Boston: Da Capo Press, 2016), prologue; John S. Pancake, This Destructive War: The
British Campaign in the Carolinas, 1780-1782, 2nd ed. (Tuscaloosa: The University of
Alabama Press, 2003), 50-55; Lawrence E. Babits and Joshua Howard’s Long, Obstinate,
and Bloody: The Battle of Guilford Courthouse (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 2009), 10-12; Mark V. Kwasny, Washington’s Partisan War, 1775-1783
(Kent: Kent State University Press, 1996) xi-xv; Wayne E. Lee, Crowds and Soldiers in
Revolutionary North Carolina: The Culture of Violence in Riot and War (Gainseville:
University Press of Florida, 2001); Robert Pugh, “The Revolutionary Militia in the
Southern Campaign, 1780-1781,” The William and Mary Quarterly 14, no. 2 (April
1957): 154-175; John Shy, A People Numerous and Armed: Reflections on the Military
Struggle for American Independence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976).
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John Singleton Mosby (1833-1916) was deeply influenced early by Weems’
literature and successfully applied the Swamp Fox’s principles during the Civil War.
Despite the praise of Generals Robert E. Lee, Ulysses S. Grant, and Phillip Sheridan,
Mosby’s military genius was overshadowed by defeat. He was engulfed by a volatile
mixture of northern novels and films that portrayed him as a villain and “Lost Cause”
entertainment that glorified his exploits. Historians Paul Ashdown and Edward Caudill
explain that his myth arose because he “inspire[d]…interest in the press and, later, in
film, novels, television, and even among scholars.”6 The second-order effect of the terror
that Rangers created in Union soldiers’ minds was that Mosby became a bogeyman
among many northerners. The dime novel Jack Mosby, the Guerilla (1864) portrays
Mosby as a nefarious pirate who tortures prisoners and tries to burn New York City by
setting a phosphorous-soaked bed ablaze in the Astor House Hotel. Subsequent novels
like Surry of Eagle’s Nest (1866) and Mosby’s Night Hawk (1931) conversely portray
Mosby as a noble and heroic partisan. Mosby and several former Rangers wrote Memoirs
to attempt to set the record straight.7 The journalist Virgil Carrington Jones finally wrote
his first professional biography, Ranger Mosby (1944), which emphasized Civil War
6

Paul Ashdown and Edward Caudill, The Mosby Myth: A Confederate Hero in Life and
Legend (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources Inc., 2002), xxiii-xxviii, 7.
7
Unknown, Jack Mosby, The Guerilla Chief (New York: T. Dawley, 1864), chapter 1,
36, http://galenet.galegroup.com; John Esten Cooke, Surry of Eagle’s Nest; or, The
Memoirs of a Staff Officer Serving in Virginia (Ridgewood: Gregg Press, 1866), chapter
1; Ashdown and Caudhill, The Mosby Myth, xxiii-xxviii, 148; John S. Mosby, Mosby’s
War Reminiscences and Stuart’s Cavalry Campaigns (New York: Pageant Book Co,
1958); John S. Mosby, Stuart’s Cavalry in the Gettysburg Campaign (New York: Moffat,
1908); John S. Mosby, The Memoirs of Colonel John S. Mosby, 2nd ed. (Nashville: J.S
Sanders & Company, 1997); John Scott, Partisan Life with Col. John S. Mosby (New
York: Harper & Bros, 1867); Joseph Williamson, Mosby’s Rangers: A Record of the
Operations of the Forty-Third Battalion Virginia Cavalry, from Its Organization to the
Surrender, from the Diary of a Private (New York: R.B. Kenyon, 1896).

10
actions and was based on family and soldier interviews and correspondence. Jones’s
biography and subsequent broader monograph on guerillas are considered credible by
modern historians. Historian Bruce Catton asserted that Civil War histories prior to Jones
had portrayed guerilla warfare as a “colorful, annoying, but largely unimportant side
issue.” More professional analyses of guerilla warfare emerged in the 1980s, despite the
continued insistence by historians like Gerald Linderman that all Confederate guerillas,
including Mosby, were simply considered vermin by regular soldiers.8
Kevin H. Siepel’s professional biography Rebel: The Life and Times of John
Singleton Mosby (1983) argues that had Mosby “fought on the winning side, he would
undoubtedly be remembered as a national hero.” Jeffry D. Wert’s Mosby’s Rangers: The
True Adventures of the Most Famous Command of the Civil War (1990), is a 43rd Ranger
Battalion military history that asserts that Mosby’s Rangers were effective but did not
alter the course of the war. James A. Ramage’s subsequent biography, Gray Ghost: The
Life of Col. John Singleton Mosby (1999), argues that his personality and talent for
ruthless tactics made him the ultimate partisan leader. Paul Ashdown and Edward
Caudill’s The Mosby Myth: A Confederate Hero in Life and Legend (2002) academically
assesses Mosby’s complex legacy by asserting that the “Mosby Myth continues to
intrigue us because it represents something grandly irrepressible and yet paradoxical in
the American spirit.”9 While these historians refuse to admit that Mosby strategically

8

Virgil C. Jones, Ranger Mosby (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press,
1944); Virgil C. Jones, Gray Ghosts and Rebel Raiders (New York: Holt, 1956); Gerald
F. Linderman, Embattled Courage: The Experience of Combat in the American Civil War
(New York: The Free Press, 1987), 197-201.
9
Kevin H. Siepel, Rebel: The Life and Times of John Singleton Mosby (New York: Saint
Martin’s Press, 1983), xii; Wert, Mosby’s Rangers: The True Adventures of the Most
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altered the war, historian James McPherson argues that “guerillas forced Sheridan to
detach a third of his front-line force and prevented him from carrying out Grant’s original
orders to move east across the Blue Ridge and come up on Lee’s rear at Petersburg.” Per
Donald Sutherland’s A Savage Conflict: The Decisive Role of Guerillas in the American
Civil War (2009), “guerillas…changed the nature of the war” by increasing the violence
and length of the conflict, which convinced Union policymakers to adopt a “hard war”
policy against civilians. The current academic rub is between historians like Siepel, who
contend that guerillas benefited southern war aims; and those like Sutherland, who
counter that partisans exacerbated southern defeat by provoking reprisals. More than
revolutionary partisans, the emotional debate over the legitimacy of Confederate
partisans continues amid the expansion of guerilla scholarship.10
Was Mosby irreconcilable with southern strategy, or did the Confederacy fail to
recognize a good thing when they saw it? Mosby’s greatest strength as a partisan was his
lack of West Point training, which his mentor Stuart, and eventually Lee seemed to
recognize. Both the British and the Union naturally overreacted to partisan raids by
abusing and alienating that very same population on whose support the British, but not so
much Union success relied. Cornwallis’ overuse of blunt force effectively strengthened
Marion, who enabled Greene to clear the Carolinas. Mosby defied great odds with
remarkable talent, but was excluded from the West Point elite’s losing team.

Famous Command of the Civil War, 22; James A. Ramage, Gray Ghost: The Life of Col.
John Singleton Mosby, 2nd ed. (Lexington: The University of Kentucky Press, 2010), 2-6.
10
James McPherson, Ordeal By Fire: The Civil War and Reconstruction. 4th ed. (New
York: McGraw Hill, 2010), 479; Ramage, Gray Ghost, xxxii-xxxiii; Daniel E.
Sutherland, A Savage Conflict: The Decisive Role of Guerillas in the American Civil War
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2009), x-xiii, 277-279.
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Furthermore, the scope of his raids was ultimately too limited to weaken the Union Army
sufficiently to change the war’s outcome. Like Marion, Mosby went asymmetric because
he fought from a position of weakness. Both leaders excelled at taking small tactical bites
with lightning raids at places of their time and choosing to politically and militarily
weaken their foes. Their victories sparked fear in their enemies, increased popular
operational support for their cause, and expanded their territorial control among the
disaffected. Mosby’s rise by unconventional means was perceived as a threat by jealous
elements within the elitist Confederate power structure and was a bad omen for the
South. Both Marion and Mosby brilliantly destabilized enemy occupation forces, but
Marion’s success was leveraged by Greene; Mosby’s triumphs were ignored by Early.
The contrast between Patriot and Confederate war aims becomes clearer when one
compares Greene, the resourceful blacksmith’s son who deliberately leveraged guerilla
warfare as an effective tool; and Early, a haughty West Pointer and attorney who
arrogantly refused to deploy guerillas. Greene deliberately enabled Marion to create the
conditions to reverse the balance of power. Mosby’s skill and potential was ignored, yet
among Confederate commanders, he alone retained the tactical initiative amid southern
defeat. Why did the Confederacy and General Early disregard Mosby’s strategic potential
at such a critical juncture of the war?
I propose to compare Marion’s ambush of Major Robert McLeroth at Halfway
Swamp on December 12, 1780 with Mosby’s ambush of Sheridan’s wagon train at
Berryville on August 13, 1864, to prove that the Confederate elitist mindset, as
manifested by Early’s unwise refusal to embrace hybrid warfare, contributed to the
Confederate loss of the Valley and ultimate defeat. By first contextualizing eighteenth
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and nineteenth-century U.S. notions of virtuous warfare, and then comparing Greene’s
humble incorporation of Marion into his hybrid strategy with Early’s refusal to fully
utilize Mosby’s talents, I will reveal that the Confederate establishment valued form over
strategic function. The first chapter will establish that Marion and Mosby were similar
high-caliber partisans by chronicling their efficient and practical application of guerilla
principles within the context of unique historical, regional, socioeconomic, technological,
political, and strategic conditions. The second chapter will explain how Marion’s
historically misunderstood ambush of Major Robert McLeroth on December 12, 1780 at
Halfway Swamp tipped the scales to create a regional power shift which enabled his
unit’s transition into the conventional regional power, and thereby facilitated Greene’s
successful campaign. This chapter will explain why Marion’s small raid within Greene’s
well-defined and unified strategy added to the cumulative effect of previous raids to
trigger the critical mass necessary to shift the southern balance of power. The third
chapter will explain why Mosby’s brilliant Berryville supply train ambush on August 13,
1864, represented a strategic windfall that was squandered by a besieged war department
whose dedication to the status quo was reflected by Early’s determined refusal to
embrace hybrid warfare. The humble Greene would never have understood Early’s overinflated elitist pride which influenced his decision to remain inflexible in the face of
certain defeat.
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CHAPTER 2
The Underdogs of War: How the Southern Partisans Francis Marion And John S. Mosby
Offset Weakness by Leveraging Their Strengths
United States military history was once characterized by practical solutions.
Successful commanders who adopted courses of action based on their armies’ capabilities
and limitations compensated for material disadvantages with hybrid combinations of
regular and partisan forces. Modern insurgencies seem unique, but guerilla warfare by
regional inhabitants against the flanks and rear areas of occupation armies predominates
world military history. Major Generals Charles Cornwallis and Phillip Sheridan’s guerilla
woes confirmed the integral nature of unconventional warfare to the US. The historian
John Ellis points out that “guerilla warfare is usually the struggle of a weak people
against superior numbers and technology…[and] has to mesh with the most basic
aspirations of the people and…paying attention to the social, economic, and political
configurations of a particular society.” Patriot Brigadier General Francis Marion and
Confederate Colonel John Singleton Mosby were optimally efficient partisans whose
gravitas allowed them to offset material disadvantages by leveraging available resources
asymmetrically. They immobilized stronger armies with ancient guerilla principles and
mounted tactics tailored to their political and geographical terrain, manpower,
technology, and strategic goals.11 Despite Mosby’s talent, guerilla warfare’s stigma
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Andrew J. Birtle, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine
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influenced conservative Confederate officials to limit the scope of his operations
compared to Marion’s more essential revolutionary role. Marion and Mosby were
nevertheless alike as underdogs who became the partisan masters of their times.
The Southern People’s War
The American Revolution was radical by eighteenth-century standards. The
historian Gordon Wood argues that the Revolution was “a momentous upheaval
that…altered the character of American society [and] decisively affected the course of
subsequent history.” The movement obliterated the social stratification of the European
“great chain of being” to create the most democratically minded people in the world. The
upheaval meant different things to different people, however. Massachusetts citizens
were more opposed to arbitrary revenue acts than Virginians, who were alarmed by their
increasing indebtedness to British merchants after the Proclamation line of 1763 halted
their land speculation and arbitrarily enforced Navigation Acts cut into their profits.
Southerners like Thomas Jefferson sided with Massachusetts radicals to counter
economic and political domination from British authorities who allied with merchants,
slaves, and Indians to undermine planter autonomy. The 1774 Nonimportation Act’s
unintended consequences enabled slaves and farmers to threaten gentry authority, which
galvanized men like George Washington to fight for independence to protect the social
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order. The historian Sylvia Frey argues that the southern war was a literal revolution for
slaves, who exploited wartime chaos to gain their freedom. She argues that the southern
war “became a war about slavery, if not a war over slavery.” Notwithstanding, South
Carolina elites like Henry Laurens and Christopher Gadsden were certainly radical in the
context of an eighteenth-century world in which free societies were the exception to the
rule. They exemplified the colony-wide “well-bred, well-wed, well-fed, and well-read”
elites who were opposed to British economic and political dominance. Laurens was
radicalized by the Admiralty Courts’ attempts to make him dependent by seizing his
ships in 1765. Carolina gentry like Laurens threw their support behind the Patriot
government during the 1776 independence movement to escape arbitrary British
domination.12
Great Britain’s southern invasion ignited a true “people’s war.” The Patriot David
Ramsay described the significance of South Carolina’s militia which had existed since
1670:
All forms of government, hitherto of force in Carolina, agreed in this
particular: that every subject or citizen should also be a soldier…The laws
required every free man of suitable age, with a few necessary exemptions,
to be enrolled as a member of some militia company and to be equipped
and trained for public service…The people could not brook a standing
army in time of peace, but were required to be always ready to defend
themselves.13

12

Gordon Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York: Vintage
Books, 1993), 4-7; Woody Holton, Forced Founders: Indians, Debtors, Slaves, and the
Making of the American Revolution in Virginia (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1999), vii, 62-63, 91; Sylvia Frey, Water from the Rock: Black Resistance
in a Revolutionary Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 4, 84-95, 124-130,
140-142, 169-172, 324.
13
David Ramsay, History of South Carolina, from Its First Settlement in 1670 to the Year
1808, vol. 1, 2nd ed. (Newberry: WJ Duffie, 1858), 70-71.

17
Many southerners had been reluctant revolutionaries until the Battles of Lexington and
Concord (April 19, 1775) and Breed’s Hill (June 18, 1775) spurred South Carolina’s
Provincial Congress to raise three militia regiments and adopt a constitution on March 26,
1776. Royal governors theoretically controlled militia, but the tradition of colonists who
elected their own officers allowed the Whigs to mobilize the militias as instruments of
revolution. South Carolina’s Committee of Safety directed the newly appointed militia
commanders to crack down on internal resistance to the Patriot cause. The Whig
government suppressed Tories in 1776, but only managed to maintain subsequent civil
control by ignoring neutral civilians.14 Most South Carolinians lacked the depth of
conviction to take sides until the British invasion in June 1780 forced the issue. British
General Henry Clinton’s southern plan was to “Americanize” the war by using Redcoats
to empower subdued Loyalists to re-establish civil governance friendly to the crown. By
forcing inhabitants to either join him or fight, however, his no-neutrality policy failed to
re-establish security by effectively pitting pre-existing Whig and Tory citizen militias
against each other.15 The outcome of the militias’ civil war shaped the course of the
southern conflict.

John Rutledge, “A Proclamation,” The South Carolina and American General Gazette,
March 27, 1776, 41, microfilm; William Moultrie, Memoirs of the American Revolution,
So Far as It Related to the States of North and South Carolina, and Georgia, vol. 1, 2nd
ed. (New York: Arno Press, 1968), 75-107; John S. Pancake, This Destructive War: The
British Campaign in the Carolinas, 1780-1782. 2nd ed. (Tuscaloosa: The University of
Alabama Press, 2003), 24-25, 50.
15
Henry Clinton, The American Rebellion; Sir Henry Clinton's Narrative of His
Campaigns, 1775-1782 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954), 85-89, 110, 159-161;
Pancake, Destructive War, 24-25, 50-51, 78-81; Charles Stedman, The History of the
Origin, Progress, and Termination of the American War. By C. Stedman, who Served
Under Sir W. Hows, Sir H. Clinton and the Marquis Cornwallis In Two Volumes, vol. 2,
2nd ed. (New York: Arno Press, 1969), 198-199.
14

18
British Major General Charles Cornwallis and Patriot Major General Nathanael
Greene’s strategies were both militia-reliant. The Patriot victory at Saratoga in 1777 had
expanded Britain’s limited North American war into a vast global conflict against France,
Spain, and Holland. The American Secretary, Lord George Germain, was faced with a
stalemate in the mid-Atlantic states between 1777 and 1779, as well as the necessity for
home defense and Caribbean operations. He therefore shifted from a northern conquest
strategy to a southern invasion plan reliant upon enabling provincial militia to re-assert
themselves. Redcoats would back Loyalists who would reestablish the Empire in
America by restoring the civil government and security.16 After Cornwallis, Clinton’s
subordinate, failed to accomplish his civil-military goals by, with, and through the militia,
he effectively shifted to almost purely conventional operations. Greene conversely set the
conditions for Patriot victory by “never los[ing] sight of the fact that he was fighting a
political war.”17 Despite Britain’s decreased manpower after Saratoga, Greene was
cognizant of his inferiority in numbers, training, and equipment. He explained the
necessity of mobilizing the militia to General George Washington:
How to imploy our little force if we are attacked both in Virginia and N.
Carolina at the same time is difficult to determine…This force with the
occasional aid of the militia will serve to confine the enemy in their limits
and render it difficult for them to subsist in the interior country…I see but
little prospect of getting a force to contend with the enemy upon equal
grounds and therefore must make the most of a kind of partisan war until
we can levy and equip a larger force.18
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The South, however, was different from the world that Greene had known. Southern
operations would be complicated by the climate, geography, and society.
An eighteenth-century southern campaign required local knowledge. Slave-based
rice plantation agriculture made South Carolina the wealthiest colony and created a class
divide between the politically powerful Low Country planter elite and Scotch-Irish and
German Piedmont inhabitants. The Low Country coastal wetland region was laced with
major and estuarial river systems, swamps, sea islands, and marshes, and extended from
Georgia’s St. Lawrence River, north to North Carolina’s Cape Fear River, and sixty miles
inland (See Figure 2a). The elites’ power was built on staple crop production and a slave
labor force that comprised sixty-one percent of the population. Frey breaks down the
demographics:
In 1775 South Carolina’s white population was an estimated 70,000, the
slave population approximately 100,000. Of these, 14,302 whites and
72,743 blacks clustered in the three Low Country districts of Beaufort,
Charleston, and Georgetown; 55, 689 whites and 27,253 blacks lived in
the backcountry districts of Camden, Cheraw, Ninety Six, and
Georgetown.19
The Scottish surveyor James Whitelaw observed that southern coastal rivers made travel
difficult, and that “the good land lies mostly in narrow strips along the water sides.” The
Savannah, Salkehatchie, Edisto, Wateree, and Pee Dee Rivers were major commercial,
communication, and military arteries. Along those rivers were the large-scale plantations
of planter-elites like John Rutledge and William Drayton, who sent commodities by boat
to Charleston for export. Charleston factors like Laurens and Gadsden exported rice,
indigo, and lumber; and imported slaves and manufactured goods which they sold at their
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stores located near ferries within the river complex. The Charleston elite monopolized
politics and society.20 Such were the socioeconomic and physical obstacles for a
republican-based military uprising.
Greene’s success hinged on the assistance of knowledgeable local leaders.
Control of river planter communities was strategically vital. When Cornwallis invaded
with 4,000 Redcoats in June 1780, he attempted to pacify the interior by establishing a
chain of river-supported combat outposts. Georgetown was accessible by sea; Cheraw
Hill was connected to Georgetown by the Pee Dee River; Camden, which became his
principle outpost and supply node, was located on the Wateree, tributary to the Santee.
Rocky Mount was located further along the Wateree; Ninety Six was close to the Saluda;
and Augusta was located on the Savannah. Essential supplies like ammunition,
gunpowder, salt, rum, and clothing were shipped from Charleston up the Ashley River to
Friday’s Ferry, transshipped by land to the Santee, and then sent by flatboat to Camden.
Cornwallis relied on Royal Militia and slaves to procure crops and livestock from the
countryside, but counterinsurgency and offensive operations required the functionality of
his supply “magazines” and “chain of communications.” He established a line of posts at
Biggen’s, Nelson’s, and Scott’s Lake to provide a military presence and facilitate the
supply flow from Charleston to Camden.21 The interior outposts’ vitality depended upon
the healthy social climate and goodwill of nearby planter communities.
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Marion owned Northeastern South Carolina because he knew local conditions.
The vitality of Greene’s combat power depended on Marion’s cooperation, who he tasked
to “harass the enemies’ communications, and provid[e] intelligence in cooperation with
the [new] strategic planning of the Southern Department.” Greene and his Continentals
provided the strategic vision and direction for the southern war waged primarily by
irregulars. He offered leadership and a core of professionals around which the irregulars
steadily coalesced as circumstances improved. His operational momentum required the
buy-in of Brigadier Generals Marion, Andrew Pickens, and Thomas Sumter to mobilize
the resistance necessary for victory.22 In contrast to Major General Horatio Gates, who
effectively ignored partisans, Greene tactfully recruited Marion:
I have not the honor of your acquaintance but am no stranger to
your…merit. Your services…in aiding the forces and preventing the
enemy from extending their limits have been very important and it is my
earnest desire that you continue…Until a more permanent army can be
collected in the field at present we must endeavor to keep up a Partizan
War and preserve the tide of sentiment among the people as much as
possible in our favor.23
Cornwallis conversely sought decisive battles with what he believed was the Patriot
center of gravity, Greene’s Continental core. Like a hydra, Greene broke up his army to
garner strength from the countryside. He remained east of the Pee Dee River, sent
Brigadier General Daniel Morgan’s 120 miles west of the Catawba River to assist
partisans in western South Carolina, and eventually detached Colonel Lighthorse Harry
Lee’s mounted “Legion” to assist Marion. The strategy emboldened partisans who
augmented Greene and undermined Cornwallis’ offensive by suppressing Loyalists.
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Greene stoked the southern people’s war to such a conflagration that 2,200 militia and
400 riflemen enthusiastically joined his 1,600 Continentals at Guilford Courthouse,
giving him more than two-to-one numerical superiority over Cornwallis’ 1,900
Redcoats.24 The Southern Campaign was a truly hybrid people’s war fueled by an armed
citizenry.
A Civil War by “Professionals”
The Confederate government created a professional army to fight conventionally.
One reason was Richmond’s comparatively elitist political and military establishment.
Unlike the Patriots, Confederates seceded expressly to preserve slavery and protect the
social order.25 Southern war-induced internal socioeconomic upheaval was ultimately
suppressed by an oligarchy that established and retained political control after secession.
President Jefferson Davis strove to insulate slave-based society from external and internal
turmoil by maintaining a unified, harmonious, paternalistic, deferential social order.
Confederate Nationalism built on republican pro-slavery ideals anti-democratically
empowered elites like Davis to control the political discourse, protect planter interests,
and shield society from democratic excesses. Richmond’s top-down consensus
effectively scotched the interpretation, resolution, and control of revolutionary “frictions”
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garnered by Confederate nationalism and independence.26 Furthermore, Davis’
suppression of political parties and dissent produced toxic factionalism that strengthened
his hand by allowing him to centralize military authority and create a “levee en masse”
with the first Conscription Act (April 16, 1862). In contrast to the nucleic militiaaugmented Continental Army, the Confederate army was composed of all southern white
men between eighteen and thirty-five, conscripted for three year enlistments.
Revolutionary style irregulars who once joined and left the army at will became the
minority as the war department technically embraced military theorist Baron De Jomini’s
concept of a permanent, professional army of Napoleonic-style heavy battalions and
“grand tactics.”27 Richmond’s ruling class redefined warfare.
Confederate and Union Armies conventionalized similarly. President Abraham
Lincoln used a combination of martial law and slave emancipation (September 22, 1862)
in states under rebellion to firmly secure Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri
for the Union. Unlike the eighteenth-century American Secretary George Germain,
Lincoln became free to devote the North’s full resources to crush the rebellion without
international interference. He first appealed to southern unionists, but four-to-one
numerical superiority, control of the seas, and proximity to the rebellious states meant
that Federal generals, unlike Cornwallis, were never required to back local militia in
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southern-occupied territory to accomplish war aims.28 Northern and southern state
militias that supported initial manpower requirements were incorporated into regular
armies by 1863. In the North, about 2,100,000 men, or half of the military aged
population served; in the South three-fourths, or 850,000 men served—roughly 10,000 or
less of them were ever partisans. By comparison, 56,000 British forces served in North
America throughout the American Revolution; an estimated 100,000 Patriots served at
some point or another, many were temporary militia. General Robert E. Lee’s largest
mobile army totaled 77,000; General Washington’s army never exceeded 19,000. The
Patriot Southern Campaign and Confederate Shenandoah Valley operations were
ancillary to the main theaters. Variance between Patriot and Confederate unconventional
reliance is clarified through quantitative comparisons of Marion and Mosby’s irregular
commands with their respective regular forces. Marion’s fluid 700-to-1,000-man force
was between fifteen-and-twenty-three percent the size of Greene’s fully augmented army
at Guilford Courthouse. In contrast, Mosby’s 700-to-800-man 43rd Ranger Battalion was
only three-to-four percent of the size of Early’s purely conventional 21,000-man army at
Cedar Creek.29 Confederate conscription measures and the smaller role of partisans
corroborates arguments that the elite slave-centric Confederate mindset precluded a real
“people’s war.”
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Mosby was a talented innovator enabled by his mentor, Major General James
Ewell Brown (JEB) Stuart. Unlike Marion, who began guerilla operations as a Lieutenant
Colonel, Mosby began as Stuart’s scout. He later reflected “that Stuart was the only
[officer]…who expected that [he] would accomplish anything.” After his superior
performance convinced Stuart to allow him to operate behind enemy lines in late 1862,
his raids escalated from tactical pinpricks to major Union embarrassments. Whereas
Marion had taken charge of a spontaneous resistance movement against occupiers,
Mosby was granted an independent command for pioneering sustained irregular warfare
behind a well-defined salient of enemy picket lines.30 Just as Greene leaned on Marion,
Stuart and Lee increasingly utilized partisans like Mosby and Captain Hanse McNeill. As
attrition subtracted leadership, however, less gifted leaders like Major General Jubal
Early never embraced the concept of clandestine small unit operations. The predominant
strategic obsession with largescale linear battles was reflected by General John B. Hood’s
adjutant:
The crisis is upon us…I hold it to be the paramount duty of every patriot
in the land to put his shoulder to the wheel, and make one grand
unanimous effort to defeat the enemy and drive him back at every
point…31
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Confederate creativity diminished as Grant’s 1864 coordinated offensive shrank Lee’s
manpower and resources, freedom of maneuver, and leadership pool. Guerilla warfare
had almost amounted to a lost art until a few independent-minded officers demonstrated
that avoiding enemy strong points and attacking weak points behind enemy lines was
feasible. While Generals Nathan B. Forrest and John H. Morgan conducted the largest
partisan raids in the Mississippi River Valley, Virginia produced its own unique variant.32
Virginia was the most powerful southern state. Colonial Virginia had resembled
South Carolina, but slave-based antebellum transportation and industrial advancements
facilitated the Old Dominion’s unparalleled state-wide economic diversification and
growth. The historian Aaron Sheehan-Dean argues that slavery’s widespread application
socioeconomically fused formerly disparate regions:
Farmers used slaves in all types of agricultural production in the state,
from the tobacco plantations of the central and southern Piedmont to the
wheat and cornfields of the Valley. Slaveowners also used their slaves in a
growing number of industrial pursuits, from the Kanawha salt works to the
Shenandoah ironworks to the forges of Richmond.33
Unlike divided revolutionary South Carolina, and excepting West Virginia, slavery’s
profitability coupled with internal improvements to mitigate previous “intra-state”
divisions and facilitate a fundamental “unity of purpose” among Confederate Virginians.
Comprehensive antebellum transportation developments established the connectivity of
once separate regions into an integrated society with shared political, social, and
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economic interests.34 Large rivers like the Potomac and Rappahannock remained vital
commercial and military arteries and served as successive natural defensive barriers
against Union invasion. By 1861, Virginia’s internal improvements included expanded
sea ports, canals, turnpikes, large urban factories, and more combined railroad mileage
than all states except for New York and Pennsylvania. The Confederate government
made Richmond the capital and Virginia the main theater and line of defense to protect
southern infrastructure, manufacturing, and the slave base-of-support that supported the
conventional war.35 In 1863 Mosby’s asymmetric raids behind enemy lines became a
practical solution for problems which conventional tactics were ill-suited.
As Union forces repeatedly menaced Richmond, the irregular war predominated
west of Washington D.C., Virginia’s northern Piedmont, throughout the Shenandoah and
Bull Run Valleys, and throughout West Virginia’s northern Allegheny Mountains.
Mosby’s Confederacy (See Figure 2b) consisted of Loudon, Fauquier, Fairfax, and Prince
William Counties. The limitless tactical cover and concealment within the forested Bull
Run and Blue Ridge Mountains, valleys, plantations, and farms made Rangers virtually
impossible to apprehend or eradicate.36 The Piedmont was Virginia’s wealthiest region
with the largest slave percentages; many counties consisted of fifty percent or more
slaves. Loudoun and Fauquier County residents owned the most slaves in the state, stood

Sheehan-Dean, “Old Virginia,” 60-62.
Jefferson Davis, The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, vol. 1, 1881
(Boston: Da Capo, 1990), 379-382; Sheehan-Dean, “Old Virginia,” 60.
36
Charles Russell Lowell, Life and Letters of Charles Russell Lowell, Edward W.
Emerson, ed., 2nd ed. (Port Washington: Kennikat Press, 1971), 34-38, Colonel Charles
Lowell was a Union Cavalry Commander who performed picket duty and
counterguerrilla operations against Mosby, who he referred to as “an old rat” with “a
great many holes,” 294.
34
35

28
to lose the most in the war, produced the highest enlistment rates, and were usually
behind enemy lines.37 The area was traversed by strategically important railroads, along
which spanned telegraph lines that provided instantaneous communication. The
Baltimore and Ohio (B & O) Railroad was Washington’s key communication and
sustainment line to the Old Northwest, and extended through Harper’s Ferry, a hotly
contested region just north of Mosby’s Confederacy. The hub of the vital Manassas Gap
(MGR) and Orange and Alexandria (O & A) Railroads was Manassas, in the heart of
Mosby’s Confederacy. The Union and Confederate armies both used railroads,
telegraphs, and turnpikes like the Berryville and Valley Roads to coordinate their
operations and mass troops. While Grant depended on the O & A to supply his army
during his 1864 Overland Campaign, Sheridan attempted to refurbish the MGR, which
traversed Mosby’s territory, to clear the Shenandoah Valley.38 Mosby wrought havoc on
Union operations by menacing and attacking Northern Virginia’s key military
infrastructure aggressively, frequently, and at will.
Stuart and Lee integrated Mosby. The Confederate Partisan Ranger Act on April
21, 1862 was an admission that regular forces alone were insufficient for handling larger
and encroaching Union armies. Richmond awarded Mosby command of the Ranger
Battalion in January 1863 because he demonstrated an uncanny ability to frustrate Union
operations by disrupting sustainment.39 Mosby described his tangential role:
I conducted war on the theory that the end of it is to secure peace by the
destruction of the resources of the enemy, with as small a loss as possible
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to my own side…I was directly under the orders of Stuart up to the time of
his death, in May, 1864, and after that time, of Gen. Robert E. Lee, until
the end of the war…In a letter received from Stuart about this, he said, ‘I
heartily wish you great and increasing success in the glorious career on
which you have entered.’40
He functioned like Marion—scouted and performed reconnaissance for Stuart, attacked
supply lines in the form of railroads and wagon trains, and ambushed isolated enemy
detachments, pickets, and couriers. He also cooperated with leaders like Major General
John Breckinridge and Early when they campaigned in the Shenandoah Valley. His
Rangers reached peak strength and efficiency when Major General Phillip Sheridan’s
Army of the Shenandoah faced Early’s outnumbered Army of the Valley. Unlike Greene,
who sent Marion written communication, Early never sent Mosby any written directives
or attempted serious coordination.41 His unwillingness to utilize Mosby reflected his
incompetence and antebellum elitism.

The Bygone Era
Conventional military wisdom and attitudes had changed considerably. Historian
Wayne Lee asserts that Whig revolutionaries and leaders who turned to the militia to
build the Continental Army had originally valued moral virtue as the key military
attribute and perceived standing armies as a threat to their personal liberties. Whig
ideology rooted in the English Civil War (1642-1651) and the Glorious Revolution
(1688) articulated the necessity of maintaining vigilance to safeguard liberty from two
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threats—an immoral population that invites tyrannical rule; or a monarch who dominates
a representative legislative body. Patriots who were denied Parliamentary representation,
taxed without consent, and forced into compliance by the British Admiralty Courts and
military, cited Enlightenment documents like John Locke’s “Second Treatise” to justify
their “appeal to heaven” and armed resistance against British tyranny. They compromised
their values to allow for the creation of a disciplined army to oppose the British, and
swallowed bitter apprehensions of standing armies as corrupt instruments of tyranny.42
Washington based his army on the European model. Most Continentals carried
standard smoothbore muskets equipped with bayonets with effective ranges of about
seventy-five meters. Continental armies faced British and Hessian forces in fields in
which both sides massed combat power by organizing into tightly formed units that fired
volleys at thirty paces before delivering bayonet charges. Revolutionary cavalrymen
generally carried a saber, and either a shortened musket or a blunderbuss (muzzle-loaded
shotgun). In Europe and the mid-Atlantic states, cavalry theoretically performed
reconnaissance by ascertaining enemy size, composition, location, activity, and intent;
counter-reconnaissance, by preventing the enemy from performing reconnaissance; shock
tactics, by surprising and striking a confused enemy, or an enemy’s flanks or rear without
allowing them reaction time; and pursuit, attacking retreating forces to destroy or prevent

42

Wayne E. Lee, Crowds and Soldiers in Revolutionary North Carolina (Gainesville:
University Press of Florida, 2001), 146-153; John Locke, Second Treatise of Government
(Originally Published 1690, Infomations: 2000), 65-69,
http://site.ebrary.com/lib/jmulibrary; Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the
American Revolution (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
1967), 24-27, 56-58, 110.

31
their reorganization.43 The historian Charles Royster chronicles the Patriots’
revolutionary zeal, and argues that despite the Continentals’ initial poor discipline, mass
desertions, and crisis of confidence following 1776 military reversals, Patriots ultimately
performed commensurate with their ideals.44 Yet, professionalization was never
universal.
The southern militia was shaped by unique conditions and attributes. Brigadier
Generals Marion, Pickens, and Sumter’s men were self-reliant, skilled horsemen
tempered by the Regulator Movement, five years of sporadic guerilla war, and numerous
campaigns against the Cherokee.45 European-style shock cavalry tactics were ineffective
in America’s less-developed and populated landscape. Southerners, however, were
almost always mounted to negotiate their more wretched roads and restrictive terrain.
“Light-horse” Henry Lee explained the importance of horsemanship to southern society:
No country in the world affords better riders…especially the States south
of Pennsylvania. The boys from seven years of age begin to mount…[and]
become so completely versed…as to equal the most expert horseman
anywhere.46
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Southerners mainly abandoned European tactics in favor of their own frontier-style of
fighting after the Battle of Camden on August 18, 1780. They sometimes fought from
horseback, but usually rode to battle and fought dismounted. They used whatever
weapons were available, including “firelock” rifles, Brown Bess and Queen Anne
muskets, pistols, hatchets, crude swords, and occasionally sabers. The historian Jac
Weller calls Marion “the great master of partisan surprise.” His men would typically ride
up to sixty miles through the swamps to infiltrate, surround, surprise, and inflict
maximum casualties at close quarters on enemies at night or at dawn. Marion’s one rifleequipped company would typically remain beyond the grasp of enemy units and deliver
deadly harassing fire; another tactic was to bait enemy units with small cavalry
detachments into numerous successive ambushes.47 With the help of partisans, Greene
officially adopted the same tactics by instructing Morgan to avoid pitched battles in favor
of raids wherein “success would not greatly depend upon the numbers but on the secrecy
and spirit of the attack.”48 Greene’s practical mindset became a foreign concept to
subsequent Confederate elites.

Suppression of a National War
The Confederate oligarchy defined political and military protocol. Only one third
of southerners owned slaves by 1861, and many valued the traditional concept of a
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citizen militia. Some Confederates, like Mosby, agreed with Lincoln that the issue of
slavery had caused the war; others were compelled by honor, resented invasion, or
believed that the Constitution was a compact between sovereign states. Numerous
citizens and politicians like Kentucky Senator Henry C. Burnett favored a revolutionary
style people’s war, or what Jomini termed a “national war.” The Richmond Enquirer even
stated that “A People in Arms’ cannot be conquered.”49 Nevertheless, Davis’ West Point
clique dominated the military, disliked guerillas, and comprised 36.7 percent of the
Officer Corps. The historian William Skelton argues that the West Point establishment
“shaped in myriad ways the conduct of the war: strategy, tactics, logistics, staff
operations, and civil military operations.”50 Civil War tactics therefore became
characterized by close-order regimental formations whereby successive two-deep lines of
soldiers fired massed volleys, typically with Enfield or Springfield rifled muskets. Their
weapons’ Minie balls and rifling increased maximum effective ranges to 400 yards. The
historian Grady McWhiney argues that the doctrine influenced by Jomini and Dennis
Hart Mahan advocating “tactical offensives,” frontal assaults, and bayonet charges,
coupled with deadly new weaponry, produced the war’s horrendous casualties.51 The
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improved accuracy and rates of fire meant that cavalry no longer attacked infantry lines
head-on. Mounted units like Stuart’s screened for the army, performed reconnaissance
and counter-reconnaissance, and attempted to neutralize enemy cavalry.52 Nevertheless,
no organization defied convention and military theory like the individualistic “young
bloods” of the Confederate Cavalry.
The distinction between regular and irregular southern cavalry was blurry. Many
of Forrest and Morgan’s men, for example, were temporary civilian-clad troopers who
melted back into the population after raids. Like Stuart’s cavalry, everyone in Mosby’s
unit was an expert rider with two “indispensable” items, pistols and horses. Their tactical
proficiency supports historian Bertram Wyatt-Brown’s assertion that a southern “code of
honor” required youth “to prove early virility” by willingness to fight, shoot, play sports,
and “a duty to ride [a horse] with expertise.” General William T. Sherman described them
colorfully:
War suits them and the rascals are bold to rashness and dangerous subjects
in every sense…This is a larger class than most men suppose and they are
the most dangerous set of men that this war has turned loose upon the
world. They are splendid riders, first-rate shots, and utterly reckless.
Stewart, John Morgan, Forrest, and Jackson are the types and leaders of
this class.53
Wyatt-Brown believed that southern society was warlike because vigilantism, lynch law,
dueling, and slave patrols became “expressions of community will,” and white males’
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obligation to manage chattel slavery perpetuated southern social institutions.54 The
Rangers built a ferocious reputation that epitomized Sherman’s observations and WyattBrown’s theories.
The historian Jeffry Wert emphasizes that “the Rangers took excellent care of
their mounts,” and “rode some of the finest horses in the Old Dominion.” Their weapon
of choice was the six-shot, single action, .44 caliber Army Colt revolver. Rangers
typically carried two revolvers and occasionally carbines or shotguns. They almost never
used sabers. As they moved to enemy areas Mosby sent ahead small reconnaissance
parties to scout objectives, assembled men at nearby rally points, identified concealed
attack positions and arrayed the men, and then signaled the Rangers to approach the
engagement areas in columns of four. After final halts in which he identified the target,
he directed the Rangers forward in “helter-skelter” races in which his men swarmed and
rode through their enemies in brief, intense, close-quarter engagements with pistols.
Rangers familiar with the terrain often dominated comparably sized Union cavalry
detachments, not only by exploiting the element of surprise, but because pistols simply
outperformed sabers in close-quarter engagements. Mosby occasionally initiated attacks
by directing his small, mobile artillery battery to fire shots into the surprised enemy.
After lightning attacks on pickets, troop detachments, couriers, outposts, headquarters,
trains, and wagon convoys, Rangers quickly dispersed into the surrounding mountains
and farms. The historian Bruce Catton points out that since Confederate cavalry “could
have taught circus riders tricks, the Yankees were hopelessly outclassed.” Mosby took a
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page from Marion’s playbook by sending small detachments to bait enemy units through
gauntlets of successive ambushes.55 Surprise cavalry raids were a southern specialty that
transcended technology.
Irregular Solutions Across Time
Marion and Mosby tailored partisan warfare to societal conditions and approached
“people’s war[s]” economically in response to superior numbers and technology.
Clausewitz asserts that in a “people’s war,” a weak army can overcome a stronger one by
directing and cooperating with “militia and bands of armed civilians,” or partisans.
Partisans, he said, should avoid direct confrontation with superior forces, harass enemy
outposts and detachments in rear and flank areas with hit-and-run tactics calculated to
inflict maximum damage with minimal risk, suppress civilian support for the enemy, and
augment the professional army in conventional battles under favorable circumstances.25
Both achieved what Jomini and Clausewitz considered the partisans’ primary goals. The
“feeling of uneasiness and dread” that they created increased “a thousandfold the
difficulties” of their enemies by creating hostile environments that engulfed invading
units. Cornwallis described the effects of Marion’s raids in 1781:
Colonel Marion has so wrought on the minds of the people, partly by the
terror of his threats and cruelty of his punishments and partly by the
promise of plunder, that there was scarce an inhabitant between the Santee
and the Pedee that was not in arms against us. Some parties even carried
terror to the gates of Charleston.56
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In 1864, a Unionist newspaper reported that “the timid ones” are “afraid [that] Mosby
will dash across the river…[and] burn Hagerstown,” and that “Mosby has attacked our
troops at different points between Winchester and Harper’s Ferry…and has gobbled up
some prisoners.” They accomplished what modern strategists refer to as the three
principles of irregular warfare: the “logistical principle,” disruption of supply and
communication lines to slow an enemy invasion; the “corrosion principle,” attenuation of
enemy morale and civilian war support with raids that discredit, delegitimize, and
destabilize the enemy occupation; and the “diversion principle,” compelling the enemy to
weaken his line of battle strength by diverting troops to protect weak points such as
outposts, detachments, and convoys.57 Despite their policy makers’ different decisions
about irregular warfare, both were optimally efficient.
When the revolutionary government vanished as the British captured Charleston,
the pre-1780 militia system “conferred upon…partisan leaders the authority” to operate.
Marion’s ragged force of planters and farmers, often refugees, varied in size based on
military circumstances and crop cycles.27 These “people in arms” rallied to Marion,
Pickens, and Sumter in response to brazen Redcoats and Tories who often abused them
and burned them out of their homes. Ramsay explained the essence of Marion’s strength:
Revenge and despair cooperated with patriotism to make these ruined men
keep the field. The devouring flames sent on defenseless habitations by
blind rage and brutal policy, increased not only the zeal but the number of
his followers. For several months he and his party were obliged to sleep in
the open air, and to shelter themselves in the thick recesses of the deep
swamps.58
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As arbitrary violence swelled the militia surrounding British garrisons like storm clouds,
partisans remained just beyond the grasp of the superior forces which they corroded by
striking isolated detachments and supply convoys before melting into the swamps.
Marion’s other major objectives were the Wateree, Congaree, Santee, and Pee Dee
Rivers, which critically disrupted interior sustainment and communication. He
logistically snarled Cornwallis by disrupting river and road supply and communication;
corroded British strength by creating Loyalist fear and British doubt among civilians and
politicians who demanded a quick victory; and diverted large numbers of Redcoats who
were tasked to escort supply convoys and perform counter-guerilla operations. He gained
dominance of the Low Country by December 1780, which enabled Greene’s Continentals
to achieve the strategic victories that rendered Cornwallis incapable of further offensive
operations.59 Mosby put Marion’s principles to work in Virginia.
Lincoln’s conciliatory strategy failed partly because occupied areas remained
hostile. One of Mosby’s officers explained how Northern Virginia provided an
enthusiastic manpower pool and ample civilian support:
Robin Hood concealed his men in the solitudes of Sherwood Forrest;
Marion took refuge in the inaccessible swamps of Carolina…but Mosby in
an open country finds security and dispersion among a friendly and
chivalrous people…But in some instances, in order to insure greater
security, the men have built themselves huts in the mountains.60
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Rangers validated Jomini’s concept that “[i]n mountainous countries the people are
always most formidable.” They applied “classic techniques of stealth, surprise, speed,
and deception…,sought out weak points, [struck] their targets quickly” and disappeared.
Their operations at times tied down roughly one-third of the Union Army and rendered it
too weak to destroy the Army of Northern Virginia. Lincoln complained that “in no other
way…does the enemy give us so much trouble, at so little expense to himself.” They also
accomplished the logistical, disruption, and corrosion principles of irregular warfare.61
Sheridan’s Valley Campaign was a case in point. Mosby’s sensational kidnapping of
generals, destruction of wagon convoys, and elimination of the MGR as a supply line
convinced Sheridan not to use the Valley as an avenue of advance against Charlottesville
in 1864. Mosby’s attacks were sensationalized by newspapers, which aided his creation
and full exploitation of fear in the minds of Union soldiers. After the war, Sheridan
confessed that Mosby was the “most redoubtable” guerilla leader because he “depleted
[Sheridan’s] line-of-battle strength [by] necessitating…large escorts for…[his] supplytrains.”62
Marion and Mosby discovered the formula for success by using limited resources
to the greatest effect. Just as Shun Tzu and Genghis Khan applied guerilla tactics to cope
with bigger armies, Marion and Mosby similarly achieved asymmetric mastery.63 They
targeted vulnerable units and unsympathetic civilians, but their success relied on a
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sympathetic populace. Under their enemies’ noses they cooperated with civilians who
enthusiastically supported them from the swamps and mountains. Slave uprisings never
significantly affected revolutionary partisans, but Sheridan’s Valley devastation and slave
emancipation significantly undermined Mosby’s civilian support. Their greatest asset was
the horse, which expanded their tactical capabilities by allowing freedom of movement.
Their skills and regional familiarity made them efficient partisans. While Marion enabled
Greene’s Continentals to defeat Cornwallis and clear the South, Mosby’s Rangers
retained a hollow tactical initiative as the Confederate strategy disintegrated under the
Union military. Yet both proved that guerilla principles transcend time.
Two underdogs became archetypal partisans. It is difficult to measure the
success of a counterinsurgency and, likewise, to quantify the strategic impact of guerillas.
The similar nature and effectiveness of their raids are clear, however. That their
psychological impact and legends grew out of proportion with their exploits signifies
success: they penetrated their enemies’ psyches and captured Americans’ imaginations.
While historians have acknowledged their skill, Mosby’s paradoxical image is tainted by
the “slave power” defeat, and associated with the garden variety of guerillas that remain a
touchstone of academic debate. Many historians insist, however, that neither
revolutionary nor Civil War partisans should be ignored. The common observation that
armies are reflections of their societies applies to Marion and Mosby. While guerilla
warfare never produced a Confederate victory, neither did conventional operations.
Partisan warfare was a phenomenon that devastated the Low Country and Valley alike.
Revolutionary victory provided hope and glory to survivors of the mayhem, but for
Valley residents the partisan war stoked the flames of defeat. Outcomes aside, Marion
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and Mosby were underdogs who used their strengths and limited resources to cope with
impossible odds and, ironically, neither the British nor the Union armies ever effectively
coped with them.
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CHAPTER 3
Out-Politicked: How Francis Marion’s Ambush of Major Robert McLeroth Helped
to Shift the Southern Balance of Power and Shape the War
Francis Marion personified South Carolina’s Low Country military establishment.
The Low Country is a wetland region of major and estuarial river systems that spans from
the Georgia Sea Islands to Wilmington, North Carolina, and roughly sixty miles inland
(See Figure 3a). Marion was born at Goatfield Plantation, and grew up around the Santee,
Black, and Pee Dee Rivers. He gained tactical experience during the Cherokee War
(1760-1761) as a young lieutenant when his platoon cleared a Cherokee war party from a
dangerous pass near Etchoe, North Carolina. His supervisor called him a “hardy soldier,
and an excellent partisan officer.” When the American Revolution began in 1775, Marion
was a high-value individual—a seasoned and connected leader in sync with local political
and geographic terrain. He owned a Santee River plantation by 1773, and represented St.
John’s Parish in the first Provincial Congress in 1775. He joined South Carolina’s Second
Continental Regiment as a captain and rose to lieutenant-colonel for his firm combat and
garrison leadership.66 Marion countered Lord Charles Cornwallis’ invasion and
occupation of South Carolina in the summer of 1780 by leading his constituents in a yearlong hit-and-run campaign that critically weakened British control. Major General
Nathanael Greene needed serious help when he took over a shattered Continental Army
in Charlotte, North Carolina on December 2, 1780. Greene integrated Marion’s command
into his strategy. He succeeded by fully leveraging Marion’s guerillas against British
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supply lines and manpower. Marion wrested northeastern South Carolina from
Cornwallis’ grip as Greene drew him into North Carolina. Marion’s campaign culminated
on December 12th at Halfway Swamp, when he shifted the regional balance of power by
crippling Cornwallis’ sustainment and civilian support network sufficiently to facilitate
Greene’s successful Southern Campaign.
Nathanael Greene was faced with a raw southern deal when he first reached
Charlotte. He could do little more than menace Cornwallis’ vastly superior army at
Winnsboro, South Carolina. British General Henry Clinton’s capture of Charleston (May
12, 1780) and the entire southern army of 5,600 men had been the most significant
British victory of the American Revolution. The pro-war Whitehall politicians were
reinvigorated, and the Patriot war effort received a devastating blow that preceded Major
General Benedict Arnold’s treason, Ethan Allen’s Vermont separatist movement, and
Continental Army officer mutinies.67 Cornwallis, Clinton’s second-in-command, had
invaded the Carolina interior in early June and established combat outposts in Augusta,
Ninety-Six, Camden, Rocky Mount, Cheraw, and Georgetown (See Figure 3b). The
outposts formed an arc from Georgetown to Augusta, discouraged resistance, and
projected British power. Between Charleston and the interior posts were smaller
subsidiary depots along the major river systems that were occupied by Redcoats,
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Hessians, and Loyalist militia.68 Cornwallis’ destruction of a second Continental Army
under Major General Horatio Gates at Camden (August 16, 1780) destroyed the last
Patriot conventional force in the South. What Greene inherited when he took command of
Gates’ “army” were approximately 950 Continentals and 1500 militiamen who were
disorganized, malnourished, and half naked. The military situation had looked much
more promising after the Patriot victory in Saratoga (1777), as France, Spain, and
Holland all declared war on Britain, challenged British naval supremacy, and siphoned
away British North American troops. Despite decreased manpower in 1780, Clinton
commanded 33,893 North American soldiers; in the South, Cornwallis commanded a
combined 6,700-man Loyalist and Regular force.69 Greene’s recognition of his meager
resources and prescient grasp of an asymmetric situation on the ground influenced his
deliberate choice of an unconventional strategy.
There was no going back to a Gates-style confrontation with Cornwallis’ worldclass army in a narrow field whereby tightly formed armies exchanged massed musket
volleys at 100 yards before delivering bayonet charges. Charles Stedman, Cornwallis’
commissary general, commented after the war that Greene was “sensible that his present
force was too weak to attempt any direct operation against…Cornwallis…but
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might…spirit up the militia, without whose assistance and cooperation he saw that he
could do nothing effectual.” Greene’s strategy reflected reality. He ironically
demonstrated a better understanding of Saratoga’s strategic lessons than Gates. In 1777,
Gates’ New England subordinates had executed a Fabian-style fighting withdrawal
southward up the forested Champlain Valley in which small militia bands obstructed,
harassed, sniped, and attacked the flanks and rear of British Major General John
Burgoyne’s superior army. Patriots thus corroded Burgoyne’s army as it penetrated New
York by cutting his long supply lines and destroying foraging parties through lightning
attacks acknowledged by modern theorists as guerilla raids. The overwhelming and
concerted turnout of guerillas under leaders like Brigadier General John Stark helped
produce a Patriot victory by augmenting Gates’ army and engulfing Burgoyne’s. Greene
adapted the Saratoga strategic blueprint to the South by incorporating available and wellestablished local guerillas—Marion, Thomas Sumter, and Andrew Pickens—into a
genuinely hybrid strategy that combined conventional and guerilla operations. Military
theorist Max Boot characterizes Marion’s raids as asymmetric because they politically
delegitimized and weakened the British with minimal insurgent casualties. Marion clearly
fit Carl Von Clausewitz and Mao Tse-tung’s model of a partisan as an officially
sanctioned Continental officer who assisted the regular army by organizing and leading
local inhabitants in asymmetric raids.70 Greene embraced a hybrid strategy because he
had to use available resources and a plan that might actually work.
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Partisans would constrict British operations to facilitate Continental operations.
As Greene entered South Carolina from Charlotte, he sent written orders to Marion,
Sumter, and Pickens that articulated a clear plan of cooperation. Marion, however,
possessed the key to Greene’s success. He was geographically poised to threaten the
major Santee and Pee Dee River systems that were the vital supply conduits between
British-occupied Charleston and Georgetown, and Cornwallis’ strategic outposts and
army in the interior. To that end, Greene deliberately tasked Marion to disrupt British
supply lines, subdue Loyalists, and provide intelligence. To cope with Cornwallis’
superior 4000-man mobile army and his own acute supply challenges, Greene divided his
army and executed a strategic withdrawal as a means to prolong Britain’s increasingly
unpopular war and achieve the material parity necessary to fight decisive battles. The
distance between two smaller Continental armies, Greene in the East, and Brigadier
General Daniel Morgan in the West, enabled ease of supply from the devastated
countryside; emboldened state-wide partisan operations; and attenuated Cornwallis by
baiting him to divide his own army and extend his increasingly vulnerable supply lines
deep into hostile territory.71 Marion would attack Cornwallis’ sustainment vitals to enable
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Greene and Brigadier General Daniel Morgan to fight on more equal terms in Cornwallis’
front, and eventually win strategic victories at Cowpens (January 17, 1781) and Guilford
Courthouse (March 15, 1781).72
Greene’s plan exploited a situation that had ripened prior to his arrival. The
British southern strategy was collapsing. Clinton’s altruistic intent had been for “loyal
subjects” to be “assist[ed] in the restoration of civil government and peace” when the
situation permitted. His strategy, however, lacked clear terms for Loyalist reempowerment, which amounted to murky military objectives for the officers tasked to
pacify the province. Clinton’s combined policies of conquest as a pre-condition for civil
government and racial manipulation were detrimental to his goal of “Americanizing” the
war.73 Clinton had issued the Phillipsburg proclamation on June 30, 1779, which
promised security to all slaves who escaped to the British army, but threatened to auction
those caught aiding the rebels. South Carolina’s overwhelming fugitive slave turnout in
response to the initial British invasion convinced Clinton to modify his original policy.
He tenuously retained the social order and Loyalist allies by directing Charleston’s Board
of Police to return slaves to Loyalists; Whigs’ escaped slaves served in army support
roles; and captured slaves were impressed into labor gangs.74 Clinton’s surrender terms at
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Charleston stipulated that captured Continental soldiers would become prisoners, while
the 2,500 militia were “permitted to return to their homes on parole” if they remained
neutral. Clinton then made another crucial policy modification before he relinquished
departmental command to Cornwallis and sailed to New York.75 He declared his original
parole terms void, and issued a new proclamation on June 3rd that required previously
neutral parolees to either take a new oath to actively support “His Majesty’s
government,” or be treated as enemies. British Admiral Mariot Arbuthnot, Clinton’s copeace commissioner at Charleston, observed that “we seem to be so wedded to our
military power that it will not be parted with until it cannot be avoided.”76 The toxicity of
Clinton’s policy adjustments became clearer as Cornwallis wholeheartedly attempted to
enforce them.
Loyalist re-empowerment catastrophically collapsed. In June 1780, Cornwallis
organized a “Royal Militia” to serve as a provincial police for the maintenance of “peace
and good order.”77 He reported his efforts to Clinton:
As the different districts submitted, I, with all the dispatch in my power,
formed them into militia, and appointed field officers according to the old
divisions of the province. I invested these field officers with civil as well
as military power…This militia, both officers and soldiers, is composed of
men, either of undoubted attachment in the cause of Great Britain, or
whose behavior has always been moderate.78
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Major Patrick Ferguson oversaw the militia by visiting the districts to “procure [muster]
lists” and to ensure that Cornwallis’ “orders [were] carried into execution.” Cornwallis’
delusion that his Camden victory had pacified the province crumbled as sudden partisan
raids coincided with the alarming deterioration of his militia. He therefore decided that
only North Carolina’s pacification could protect his South Carolina posts. Numerous
Royal militiamen deserted in the wake of Camden, and British regulars typically
perceived those who remained as unreliable pillagers, abusers, and scoundrels. Major
John Harrison, for example, proposed to Cornwallis to raise a 500-man “provincial
corps” between the Pee Dee and Wateree Rivers, which he never accomplished. After
Cornwallis unsuccessfully discouraged desertion with terror tactics, he conceded to
Ferguson’s observation that Royal Militia were “less warlike than the rebels,” and placed
heavier reliance upon regular units for essential tasks. His intended plan to empower
Loyalists effectively resulted in the relegation of the “King’s friends” to garrison duty,
British unit augmentation, and minor government positions.79 Notwithstanding, shoddy
civilian support partly reflected the adage that “loyalty is a two-way street.”
Cornwallis’ idea of the “King’s Peace” effectively pushed inhabitants to their
limits. Had Clinton never actually intended to brook neutrality, paroled Whig militiamen
like Pickens and Peter Horry, who had marched to Charleston to accept surrender terms
before returning home, fully expected to remain neutral in accordance with his original
terms. The policy shifts unleashed the fury of Cornwallis’ army on thousands of civilians

79

Cornwallis to Clinton, June 30, 1780, Stopford-Sackville, vol. 2, 169-171; Major
Patrick Ferguson to Cornwallis, August 29, and 22-23 September 1780, Cornwallis
Papers, vol. 2, 44-46, 146-147; Cornwallis to Lord Nisbet Balfour, November 22, 1780,
Cornwallis Papers, Cornwallis to John Harris Cruger, November 11, 1780, Cornwallis
Papers, vol. 3, 86-87, 268-269.

51
in early June. The Philipsburg proclamation also alienated a significant portion of the
population who feared loss of “life and fortunes” in a slave uprising. Slave-based rice
plantation agriculture amounted to a stratified social hierarchy in which slaves
represented sixty-one percent of the state population and a potentially fatal revolutionary
flaw. Cornwallis’ racial manipulation negated his efforts to pit the hardscrabble
“Upcountry” Scotch-Irish and German settlers against the Low Country planter elite by
unexpectedly galvanizing the entire white population against a perceived British attempt
to incite servile insurrection. Cornwallis awakened sleeping giants like Marion and
Pickens by forcing them to either fight former comrades, flee the province, or face
destruction of life and property. Sadistic British-backed Loyalist reprisals on Whigs and
neutrals alike characterized a failure to re-establish civil governance, which boiled into a
civil war in June 1780.80 Redcoats’ reliance on military solutions to delicate political
problems eroded the civilian support central to Cornwallis’ strategy. As the military
theorist David Galula explains:
Military action remains the principal instrument of a conventional
war…, [but] the picture is different in the revolutionary war. The
objective being the population itself, the operations designed to win it
over (for the insurgent) or to keep it at least submissive (for the
counterinsurgent) are essentially of a political nature.81
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By marginalizing the militia, alienating the population, and focusing on battlefield
victories, Cornwallis forsook his key objective: the population. His invasion destabilized
South Carolina by forcing desperate civilians to organize and resist. He thus failed to
fight a political war, which gave rise to politically savvy partisans like Marion.
Marion emerged in response to the popular demand of civilians who rallied to
established Whig political and military leaders to resist persecution. “Lighthorse Harry”
Lee, who cooperated with Marion, described him in his Memoirs:
[He] was in stature the smallest size…,enter[ed] into conversation only
when necessary..., [and] possessed a strong mind…He was sedulous and
constant in his attention to the duties of his station, to which every other
consideration yielded…The procurement of subsistence for his men, and
the contrivance of annoyance to his enemy…Beloved by his friends and
respected by his enemies, he exhibited a luminous example of the
beneficial effects to be produced by an individual, who, with only small
means at his command, possesses a virtuous heart, a strong head, and a
mind devoted to the common good.82
Marion’s solid military and political ties made him “an integral part…of his community.”
Other primary accounts of Marion corroborate Parson Weems’ lofty claim that “Marion
wished his officers to be gentlemen…[and] the officers of the regiment grew fond of
him.”83 He had escaped capture at Charleston when he fractured his ankle and was
ordered to convalesce in the backcountry (April 12). He briefly joined Gates’ Continental
Army in North Carolina when Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton, Cornwallis’ cavalry
commander, conducted a scorched-earth campaign through his home Williamsburg

82

Henry Lee, The Revolutionary War Memoirs of General Henry Lee, 3rd ed. (Boston: Da
Capo Press, 1998), 265.
83
Francis Marion, Unwaried Patience and Fortitude: Francis Marion’s Orderly Book,
Patrick O’Kelley ed. (West Conshohocken: Infinity, 2007), 70-91, 471-488; Moultrie,
Memoirs of the American Revolution, vol. 1, 165-183; vol. 2, 36-43, 496; Peter Horry and
M.L. Weems, The Life of General Francis Marion, A Celebrated Partisan Officer in the
Revolutionary War, Against the British and Tories in South Carolina and Georgia
(Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott & Co., 1857), 34-35.

53
district. He returned with sixteen men at the request of the militia, who abstained from
loyalty oaths in response to Tarleton and Lieutenant Colonel Francis Rawdon’s Black
River-area devastation, plantation and Calvinist church burnings, slave kidnappings, and
reputed no-quarter policy. Marion was with Gates’ command when he was summoned by
Major John James, who represented the militia, to return to South Carolina. By avoiding
the Camden debacle, Marion could resist on his own terms. Like other partisans, he
abandoned conventional warfare in favor of Cherokee-style night or dawn raids,
ambushes, and harassing tactics.84 Williamsburg’s residents willingly entrusted Marion
with their lives because they knew he was unwilling to squander them.
Marion’s partisans attacked the foundation of British control by disrupting supply
lines, silencing Tories, attacking patrols, and provoking overreactions. The dense swamps
aided Marion and hampered the British. Marion leveraged surprise attacks, captured and
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homemade weapons and swords, and temporary militiamen with expert equestrian and
boatmanship skills, to offset material inferiority. His partisans fully exploited the rivers,
creeks, trails, and natural cover to move constantly, control river and road
communication, avoid unnecessary risks, and strike under favorable circumstances. They
dressed like Royal Militia, easily infiltrated enemy-occupied areas, and struck like
thunder in night raids that shocked and destroyed isolated units before they melted back
into the swamps. The cumulative effect of Marion’s victories between the Pee Dee and
Cooper Rivers increased his organizational strength and weakened local British
influence. His cost-efficient raids at Nelson’s Ferry (August 20), Kingstree (August 27),
Blue Savannah (September 4), and Georgetown (October 8) bolstered his political
influence at the expense of the British opponents, whom he embarrassed and discredited.
He provoked the overreaction of Cornwallis, who sent a punitive expedition under Major
James Wemyss to destroy his guerilla support network. Wemyss burned the Indiantown
Presbyterian Church, plundered and burned “50 houses and plantations,” hung suspected
traitors, slaughtered livestock, seized slaves, and completely alienated the population.
Wemyss’ subsequent prediction that regulars would be required to reestablish local
control over the enraged inhabitants proved correct.85 Marion’s provocation of British
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violence increased revolutionary recruitment by stoking anti-British sentiment. He
accumulated political and military capital at the expense of the British, who he attenuated
through Low Country-style asymmetric warfare.
Marion’s men rivaled British regional control by October 1780. His victories
reinvigorated Whigs who provided the necessary support for his partisans to fight on
more equal terms. He was promoted to colonel by Governor John Rutledge in recognition
of his Black Mingo Creek (September 28) victory, and tasked to enforce martial law and
continue suppression of Loyalists. He established a remote supply base at Snow’s Island
and his 200-to-300-man force dominated the territory surrounding the British outposts.
His influence coincided with massive state-wide militia attacks that enveloped
Cornwallis’ strategic flanks.86 The partisan war reached a crescendo atop King’s
Mountain, South Carolina on October 7, 1780, when Ferguson’s 1,100 Loyalists were
utterly destroyed by a mounted partisan army of backcountry and “over-mountain”
militiamen. This stunning defeat cost Cornwallis one-quarter of his army and prevented
his immediate invasion of North Carolina. The British forces retreated to Winnsboro to
refit and protect the western outposts exposed by Ferguson’s defeat.87 The destruction of
Marion’s force became Cornwallis’ “first priority” as its presence disrupted the vital
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Santee River supply line to Camden that the British “totally depend[ed]” upon.
Charleston’s garrison commander was “astonished” at the extent to which Marion
frustrated British goals by “prevent[ing]” Loyalists from “com[ing] in [to] become
British subjects.” Cornwallis’ belief that the entirety of the residents between the Santee
and Pee Dee Rivers were “in arms against” him was confirmed by Marion’s subsequent
raids on Loyalist units at Tearcoat Swamp (October 26), Allston’s Plantation (November
8), and Georgetown (November 17). Marion was fundamental to the massive statewide
resistance that immobilized Cornwallis and sparked doubts about the conflict in military
circles and among civilians in the British Isles.88 Cornwallis’ military correspondence
describing his strategic stalemate was circulated and exploited by Whitehall’s peace party
and printed in The London Gazette.89 Many British civilians who had expected a quick
victory after Charleston’s capitulation grew increasingly disappointed and disheartened
by what they perceived as a costly war in a colonial backwater with no apparent end in
sight.
The turbulent southern war hung in the balance when Greene took command. As
he refitted and reorganized his army in Charlotte, Cornwallis replaced his King’s
Mountain losses with a division of Major General Alexander Leslie’s regulars from
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Virginia and concentrated a 4,000-man strike force. After an unsuccessful attempt to
eliminate Marion in early November, he decided to move north into North Carolina,
destroy Greene’s army, and thereby crush the last remaining conventional military force.
Cornwallis’ dilemma was that he had to disperse his units in order to “check the
guerillas,” protect supply lines, and control the population; but by concentrating he
completely relinquished control of the backcountry and his supply lines to partisans.90
Cornwallis desperately needed to secure his vital rear-area sustainment network that
extended from Charleston through the Low Country to his army before resuming the
offensive (January 7, 1781). To regain freedom of action, he ordered Major Robert
McLeroth’s 300-man 64th Regiment from Charleston to Kingstree, the seat of Marion’s
district, to pacify the area between Nelson’s Ferry and the High Hills of the Santee (See
Figures 3a and 3b). McLeroth briefly occupied Kingstree and reestablished the Santee
River and Road communication between Charleston and Camden, which would serve as
Cornwallis’ main supply and communication hub during his campaign. In early
December, Rawdon ordered McLeroth to escort 200 fresh recruits of the 7th Regiment
(Royal Fusiliers) from Sumter’s Great Savannah plantation, north along the Santee River
Road (present-day Highway 76) to the High Hills of the Santee, where Major John
Coffin’s 140 New York Volunteers would then escort them to Camden.91 Scouts who
covered the northeastern Low Country circulated through Marion’s position at
Shepherd’s Ferry to apprise him of McLeroth’s situation and whereabouts. He patiently
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awaited the return of his partisans from their crop harvests and for an opportunity to
strike.
Marion’s ambush of McLeroth’s column at Halfway Swamp signified his
importance to Greene’s efforts and heralded his brigade’s successful transition from a
partisan unit into the dominant regional conventional power. McLeroth’s Kingstree
presence threatened to re-establish British control in northeastern South Carolina. His
potential cooperation with Major James Cassells’ nearby 200-man Royal Militia at Great
Savannah, and Major John Coffin’s 140 provincials at the High Hills might reverse
Patriot success in the region.92 As McLeroth’s soldiers “leisurely” marched north along
the Santee River Road through Halfway Swamp on December 12, at approximately 12
p.m. a portion of Marion’s 700 partisans emerged from the dense surrounding wetlands
and assaulted the rear of his column. After driving in the rear pickets, Marion deployed
Captain William McCottry’s rifle company to suppress the rear guard with sustained fire
as he directed two mounted assault elements to strike McLeroth’s flank and front. This
well-coordinated ambush drove the 64th and the panicked Fusiliers northwestward into a
field adjacent to the road, where McLeroth took cover and arrayed his men into a
defensive posture behind a fence (See Figure 3c). Marion’s militia pursued, delivered
sustained sniping fire on McLeroth’s pickets, and settled into a concealed position in the
woodlands opposite the road from the British. As the fight began to develop, McLeroth
sent Marion an officer with a flag of truce, protested the attack on his pickets, and
challenged Marion to bring his men out of the woods and into the field for a fair fight.
Marion replied that house burning was a worse crime than assaulting pickets, which he
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planned to continue unabated in retaliation for British terror tactics. Marion hotbloodedly called McLeroth’s proposal an act of desperation, but accepted the challenge
nonetheless. Both leaders agreed to select twenty of their best men to fight a pitched
battle just south of an old oak tree in McLeroth’s field in order to minimize bloodshed.93
The contest was a ruse. Marion chose Major John Vanderhorst to lead twenty of
his best partisans and delivered a motivational speech to the detachment before they
moved onto the field. Vanderhorst’s team deployed into line of battle and closed to
within 100 yards of McLeroth’s Redcoats, who then suddenly shouldered their arms and
marched from the field. The confused partisans celebrated with loud shouts of
“HUZZAH” as they occupied the field around sundown. McLeroth’s ploy was calculated
to gain time and reinforcements. When Marion had begun the attack, McLeroth sent
couriers to Coffin for assistance. Coffin received the couriers, but denied reinforcements
in order to assume a strong defensive position behind nearby Swift Creek for fear of
being ambushed himself. That evening, a detachment of McLeroth’s men built large
bonfires and made noise as a diversion so that the main column could withdraw
northward toward nearby Singleton’s Mill. The next morning Marion realized that he had
been tricked, and sent Majors John James and Hugh Horry with 100 cavalry to intercept
and hold McLeroth until his main force could catch up. James interdicted McLeroth by
positioning his partisans among the Singleton Family’s houses on a high hill that covered
the British escape route. After James’ snipers hit a British captain, they suddenly
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discovered that the Singleton family had smallpox, and abandoned their position and the
pursuit of the British. McLeroth subsequently escaped to Camden with six killed or
wounded, including Captain George Kelly of the 64th Regiment; he reported that Marion
lost “ten or a dozen” killed and wounded in the affair.94
Halfway Swamp was pivotal because Marion won control of northeastern South
Carolina’s key supply lines and civilian population as Cornwallis mobilized for his thrust
into North Carolina in early January. Former Marine Scott Aiken diverges from
historians who have trivialized Halfway Swamp. He points out that the ambush was
Marion’s first engagement after Greene entered the fight, and that Marion’s 700 partisans
won control of the Low Country between Georgetown and the High Hills of the Santee.
Marion gained the ability to hold the Santee River and Road—he no longer had to retreat
after attacking. He definitively denied Cornwallis his sustainment network at the critical
juncture when he was compelled to completely abandon counterinsurgency operations
and pursue Greene. Marion’s success also underscored to the 2000-to-3000 British
residual forces remaining in South Carolina the danger of leaving their outposts
undefended. William Dobein James, who was fifteen when he joined Marion, provides
the only detailed primary account of Halfway Swamp. William James had close ties with
Marion’s key officers and soldiers as a partisan and the son of Major John James.
William gleaned the details of the Halfway Swamp action from his father and Captain
Gavin Witherspoon, who was one of the twenty picked men under Vanderhorst.95 While
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the scale of the ambush was irrelevant, some historians persist that James exaggerated the
action.
Historian Richard K. Showman suggests that James fabricated the Halfway
Swamp story because Marion simply reported to Greene in his official correspondence
that he had “skirmaged” with McLeroth, and did not mention the contest. Showman
misses the point. “Skirmishes” were highly relevant to the southern revolutionary war.
Skirmish was the partisans’ term for the kind of fluid, Indian-style raiding and harassing
tactics that defined irregular warfare. Marion also described his November Georgetown
raid as a “scrummage,” and his partisans refer to a wide range of their well-known
actions as skirmishes in their pension applications. William Kendle, for example, was a
soldier under Majors Horry and James at Singleton’s Mill, and described the entire action
as “a skirmish in which [the partisans] totally routed the British and Tories.”
Unconventional warrior Mao Tse-tung significantly asserts that guerilla warfare has no
“decisive battle[s],” but that “[t]he total effect of many local successes will be to change
the relative strengths of the opposing forces.” At some juncture, he argues, guerillas
“develop into orthodox forces” that cooperate with regular army units. Halfway Swamp
anticlimactically added to the sum-total of Marion’s previous actions to tip the scales and
shift the regional balance of power.96 Halfway Swamp was an asymmetric skirmish that
broke the back of British regional dominance in a hybrid war where every action counted.
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Lord Rawdon, who commanded the residual British force behind Cornwallis’
mobile army, clearly recognized the writing on the wall. Rawdon may not have known
the details of the “contest,” but he painfully understood that McLeroth’s retreat amounted
to partisan regional dominance. He angrily replaced McLeroth with Major John Campbell
on December 17th, and reported to Cornwallis that:
I must immediately dislodge Marion…so as to give our new party time to
recollect themselves and to form, I think our interest would take a very
different complexion from what it has hitherto borne…I think the scale
would be decidedly in our favor, not perhaps from attachment to us, but
from weariness of a long disquiet in which a contrary conduct has kept the
district.97
Marion’s presence prevented supply boats from ascending the Santee River to reach
Camden, and forced British wagon trains to embark on the long, circuitous route from
Monck’s Corner to Friday’s Ferry on the Congaree River. In short, Marion disrupted
Rawdon’s ability to sustain Cornwallis, who was therefore compelled to forage widely
and blindly grope his way into North Carolina in pursuit of Greene’s army (See Figure

4-5; Marion to Harrington, November 17, 1780, in Old Cheraws, 343; William Dobein
James’ reputation as a biographer was unquestioned by contemporaries. Dr. David
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3d). Greene was thrilled, and encouraged Marion to continue to “frighten the Tories…to
desert the British.” The victory facilitated Greene’s strategy by enabling Whigs to join
Greene and by denying Cornwallis Loyalist support. Furthermore, Halfway Swamp
helped convince Cornwallis to keep the 300-man 64th Regiment at Camden to suppress
partisans instead of using them for the invasion.98
Halfway Swamp allowed Marion’s partisans to consolidate their regional
dominance. The well-timed mortal blow to British forces established the conditions
necessary for Marion to effectively transition from guerilla to conventional warfare.
Governor Rutledge rewarded Marion with an official promotion to brigadier general and
command of all militia east of the Santee, Wateree, and Catawba Rivers—he now owned
the entire Low Country in a bona fide capacity.99 In late December, Marion organized his
volunteers into what became known as “Marion’s Brigade,” and appointed Colonel Peter
Horry to command the cavalry. In conjunction with Greene’s campaign, Marion directed
his adjutant, Captain John Postell, to seize anything of use to the British between Black
Mingo and the mouth of the Pee Dee River, including slaves, boats, arms and
ammunition, grains, and “provisions of any sort.” He further drained the swamp of
ambient British support by ordering the arrest of able-bodied men who refused to provide
assistance to the Patriot cause. William James referred to the period after December 1780
as “the most interesting part” of Marion’s campaign because he “brought into action all
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the energies of his officers and men.” For the first time since the British invasion, Marion
cooperated with Lighthorse Harry Lee’s mounted Continental Legion, and together they
nearly captured Georgetown, the eastern anchor of the British outposts.100 When Lee
temporarily left the Low Country to help counter Cornwallis’ North Carolina invasion,
Marion easily overwhelmed Lieutenant Colonel John Watson’s 500-man hunter-killer
expedition of regulars and Tories, and chased them out of the Low Country and back into
Camden (March 1781). Marion leveraged his success at Halfway Swamp like an
experienced grappler who locks in a chokehold on his opponent; his skillfully measured
application of force gave him the dominant position that ensured his success and doomed
his enemy’s prospects.101 This regional power shift significantly undergirded Greene’s
campaign.
Marion helped create the conditions for Greene’s strategic victory. Halfway
Swamp taught the raw 7th Fusiliers their peril and established their future tactical pattern.
At Cowpens, the same Fusiliers contributed to Tarleton’s defeat by losing their nerve,
firing prematurely, and charging in a loose formation at the decisive point of the battle.
While not solely culpable, the Fusiliers’ performance helped precipitate the catastrophe
that cost Cornwallis 120 dead and 900 captured soldiers.102 Furthermore, Marion’s efforts
coupled with other Patriot raids in South Carolina to effectively vanquish the Royal
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Militia who gathered provisions and cattle for Cornwallis. Stedman was compelled to
force captured slaves to procure the Redcoats’ food from “abandoned” plantations around
Winnsboro and Camden. When Cornwallis moved permanently into North Carolina,
however, he burned his supply train and the 50,000 pounds of meal requisitioned by
Stedman to more effectively surmount the poor roads, deep rivers, and partisan bands
between his army and Greene’s. Marion’s Loyalist suppression and stranglehold on the
Santee and Pee Dee Rivers helped to ensure that Cornwallis was neither able to reestablish supply lines, or to recruit significant militia volunteers as he entered North
Carolina.103 Greene’s hybrid strategy had visibly turned the tables. Marion’s dominance
in South Carolina enabled North and South Carolinians to swell Greene’ s army at
Guilford Courthouse to 4,400 men; and helped limit Cornwallis to 1,900 exhausted
regulars. After Cornwallis “w[on] the sort of victory which ruins an army,” he limped
with his 1,400 remaining Redcoats into Wilmington, North Carolina, and subsequently
reported to Clinton that his catastrophic losses were mainly inflicted by skillfully
deployed militia.104 Greene expelled Cornwallis from the Carolinas by executing a hybrid
strategy that fully leveraged Marion’s asymmetric raids.
Greene and Marion’s cooperation sealed the British fate in the South. From
Wilmington, Cornwallis wrote to Clinton that Virginia was his last prospect for success
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because his control of Carolina’s backcountry had been nonexistent for several months
due to a complete lack of river communication and friendly inhabitants. His choice to
stake everything on Virginia and abandon the Carolinas was strongly influenced by the
prospect of Greene and Marion’s consolidation in partisan-controlled northeastern South
Carolina.105 From Wilmington, Cornwallis explained the danger of re-entering South
Carolina to American Secretary of State Lord George Germain:
The distance from hence to Camden…and the difficulty of passing the
Pedee when opposed by an enemy render it utterly impossible for me to
give…assistance, and I apprehend the possibility of the utmost hazard to
this little corps…This might enable General Greene to hem me in among
the great rivers and by cutting off our assistance render our arms
useless…I have therefore under so many embarrassing
circumstances…resolved to…march immediately into [Virginia]…to
attempt a junction with General Phillips.106
Marion produced the friction that stopped Cornwallis’ progress, sapped British war
support, and energized the opposition. Despite Loyalist newspaper propaganda in Britishcontrolled coastal cities, Cornwallis, Whitehall, and the British public were aware that the
Carolinas were lost. Max Boot explains that the democratic British Parliament
necessitated unprecedented public war support. Powerful politicians like Sir Edmund
Burke and Sir Jeffry Amherst articulated a strong public anti-war undercurrent and
exploited Cornwallis’ difficulties. Burke and London Gazette readers who were tired of
the war interpreted Cornwallis’ October, 1780 problems as evidence of failure. Before
receiving news of Yorktown (October 19, 1781), Burke implied that Cornwallis had been
compelled to “escape” the Carolinas. He even colluded with Henry Laurens, the former
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Continental Congressional President who was imprisoned in the Tower of London, and
distributed Laurens’ subversive essays among Parliament members.107 The salient second
and third order effects of Greene’s successful hybrid strategy had significant geostrategic
ramifications.
Cornwallis’ retreat into Virginia allowed Greene to retake the Carolinas. As
Greene entered South Carolina, he incorporated Marion’s Brigade into a more
conventional army that captured Georgetown, cleared the remaining British from the
interior, and re-established Patriot civil governance.108 Marion had started with only
sixteen men, but regained the Low Country by leveraging warfare politically to weaken
and break British control, which collapsed with a whimper at Halfway Swamp. He was
careful never to tactically bite off more than he could chew, and gradually weakened the
enemy politically and militarily with lightning raids at places of his time and choosing.
Cornwallis’ impatient commanders naturally overreacted to Marion’s raids by abusing
and alienating that very same population on whose support their success relied. While
Clinton’s strategy looked good on paper and was embraced by the King and Whitehall,
his operational lines of effort within South Carolina were poorly defined, arbitrarily
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executed, and inconsistent with the desired end state of “Americanizing” the war.
Cornwallis never seriously attempted to restore civil government, and his failure to reestablish security corroded his efforts, strengthened Marion, and undermined domestic
support. Greene’s only realistic option to beat the British was a strategy reliant upon
politically-charged asymmetric raids because he began from a position of weakness.
Marion facilitated Greene’s long-term goals by gaining the Low Country peoples’ hearts
and minds, and control of its major river systems. Marion’s victories garnered the
essential popular support that sustained Greene’s operations. Furthermore, Greene
succeeded because he designed and directed a salient hybrid strategy that channeled the
full potential of partisans like Marion. Cornwallis’ consistent overuse of blunt force wore
out his army and played to the strengths of Greene and Marion, who cooperatively waged
political warfare to overpower their British overlords.
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CHAPTER 4
Mind Over Matter: How John S. Mosby Overcame Political and Military Adversity to
Achieve Perfect Asymmetry
John Singleton Mosby represented the best of the Army of Northern Virginia. He
was born in Powhatan County to middling tobacco farmers. He grew up on a small
Albemarle County farm, where he hunted, read classics, and attended school. When
reading Parson Weems’ The Life of Marion as a boy, he “shouted aloud” as Marion
outwitted the British. He developed into a small, ruthless, and resourceful man by facing
bullies throughout his youth.113 Mosby moved to Bristol to practice law after he passed
the bar and married Pauline Clarke in 1857. He was a “constitutional unionist” who
supported the Confederate cause in 1861. His career skyrocketed after he became
Colonel James Ewell Brown (JEB) Stuart’s scout in the 1st Virginia Cavalry. Mosby
rose to colonel and command of the elite 43rd Partisan Ranger Battalion by 1864. His
Rangers’ raids and ambushes of Union troop detachments behind enemy lines between
1863 and 1865 arguably delayed Union victory for several months. Despite his
remarkable contributions, narrow-minded Confederate War Department elites were
unwilling to fully incorporate his Rangers into their strategic plans. Unlike Stuart,
Confederate Major General Jubal Early largely ignored the potential of Mosby’s hit-andrun attacks. In the fall of 1864, Early failed to recognize the opportunity to employ
Mosby as a strategic enabler against Union Major General Philip Sheridan’s
detachments and supply lines. The Shenandoah Valley spans roughly 165 miles from
Lexington, in the south, to the Potomac River in the north, and is bound by the Allegany
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Mountains to the West, and the Blue Ridge in the East (see Figure 4a). The Valley was a
strategically vital invasion corridor and the Confederacy’s “breadbasket.” Early’s
unwillingness to integrate Mosby’s Partisan Rangers into his Valley defensive plan
contributed to his own strategic irrelevance and Cedar Creek defeat on October 19,
1864.
The Valley situation was bleak for Early prior to Cedar Creek. The Union victory
at Antietam (September 17, 1862) had allowed President Abraham Lincoln to issue the
Emancipation Proclamation on September 22, 1862, which uprooted Confederate society
by turning hundreds of thousands of former slaves against their masters in the wake of
invading armies. Antietam, and the Union victories at Gettysburg (July 1-3, 1863) and
Vicksburg (July 4, 1863), strengthened Union resolve and prevented the chance of a
European-brokered cease fire. Confederate General Robert E. Lee’s Gettysburg
casualties limited him to a mainly defensive strategy; and Major General Ulysses S.
Grant’s Vicksburg victory had split the Confederacy, which denied the South vital
western manpower, stock, and international communication. Lincoln made Grant the
Union General-in-Chief in March 1864. Grant subsequently planned and executed a
coordinated offensive of five Union armies across the South in May that inhibited the
Confederate ability to shift soldiers between threatened areas.
Slowing Grant’s Overland Campaign through Virginia had cost the Army of
Northern Virginia Major General Edward Johnston’s division and three corps
commanders: Major Generals James Ewell Brown (JEB) Stuart, A.P. Hill, and James
Longstreet. By June 1864, Major General George G. Meade’s Army of the Potomac had
driven Lee’s army to the outskirts of Richmond and Petersburg, and Sherman was

73
besieging Atlanta. Both sides recognized the Valley as the essential support base and the
back door to the Army of Northern Virginia. A successful Federal Valley conquest
would deny the Army of Northern Virginia vital manpower and sustainment. More
importantly, the conquest of the Charlottesville rail hub and the Virginia Central
Railroad from the Valley would cut Lee’s rear communications, and thereby compel his
abandonment of Richmond. Lee therefore tasked Early to take pressure off his besieged
army by clearing the Valley and threatening Washington, D.C. Early’s Army of the
Valley was successful until August 1864, when Sheridan’s 45,000-man Army of the
Shenandoah won overwhelming victories at Winchester (September 19, 1864) and
Fisher’s Hill (September 21-22, 1864). Early received reinforcements from Lee in midOctober, but he needed every possible advantage to defeat Sheridan’s numerically
superior army camped at Cedar Creek.114
Previous Confederate generals had successfully used unconventional Valley
strategies. Confederate Major General John C. Breckinridge had demonstrated the
effectiveness of an unconventional strategy against Major General Franz Sigel the
previous May. With only 5,600 men, Breckinridge had evened the odds against Sigel’s
9,500-man army with a hybrid combination of regular and irregular operations.
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Breckinridge leveraged Mosby, Elijah (“Lige”) White, Harry Gilmore, and Hanse
McNeill’s irregulars to swarm the flanks and rear of Sigel’s army with guerilla attacks.
These irregulars turned the Valley into a gauntlet of constant guerilla hit-and-run attacks
on Union supply lines, couriers, pickets, and cavalry detachments. As officially
sanctioned officers who cooperated with Breckinridge’s regular army by leading locals
in guerilla attacks against Sigel’s incursion, Mosby, Gilmore, White, and McNeill were
partisans in the revolutionary mold of Brigadier General Francis Marion. Northerners
dismissively called them “bushwhackers,” whereas southerners called these
unconventional warriors “Partisan Rangers.” The Rangers’ asymmetric raids became
southern legends and northern horror stories. They eliminated Sigel’s supply lines,
demoralized his army, and decreased his line-of-battle strength by compelling him to
detach large units to protect his wagon supply convoys, railroads, and couriers.
Breckinridge’s coordinated hybrid strategy offset material inferiority by weakening and
denying crucial intelligence to Sigel’s army.115 Before even closing with Breckinridge,
Sigel reported that his “forces [were] insufficient for offensive operations in this country
[the Valley], where the enemy is continuously on my flank and rear.”116 The full use of
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Partisan Rangers thus enabled Breckinridge to concentrate 5,000 effectives to defeat
Sigel’s significantly reduced 6,500-man mobile army at the Battle of New Market on
May 15, 1864.117
Early took a different approach. Lee had sent Early’s 14,000-man Army of the
Valley from Richmond into the Valley to defeat Major General David Hunter’s larger
18,000-man force. After replacing Sigel, Hunter’s regenerated army had invaded the
Valley; defeated a smaller Confederate army at Piedmont on June 5; damaged
Staunton’s infrastructure; and burned the Virginia Military Institute (VMI) and
Governor John Letcher’s home in Lexington. Hunter menaced Lee’s rear when he
reached the outskirts of Lynchburg and threatened the vital Orange and Alexandria
Railroad. Luckily for Early, Partisan Rangers had crippled Hunter’s army by compelling
him to completely abandon his supply lines. Early therefore attacked and drove away a
weakened Union army at Lynchburg on June 18th that was plagued by guerillas; had
foraged to meet supply requirements; lacked shoes in some units; and was critically low
on ammunition. Notwithstanding, Early was unable or unwilling to acknowledge that
Mosby and other partisans had facilitated the corrosive atmosphere that enabled his
victory over Hunter from the Valley.118 After the war, Lee’s “bad old man” expressed
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skepticism of Grant’s report that Hunter withdrew from Lynchburg because of a lack of
ammunition:
This is a little remarkable…Can it be believed that Hunter set out on so
important an expedition with an insufficient supply of ammunition?...[He]
tarried on the way for purposes which will hereafter appear, and when he
reached there, his heart failed him and he was afraid to fight an inferior
force…119
Early was a West Pointer, a North Carolina attorney, and an inexperienced corps
commander who had replaced A.P. Hill at the Battle of the Wilderness (May 5-7).120 He
was no knight in shining armor, but his decisions as an independent commander
demonstrated his preference for a conventional military strategy.
Early demonstrated indifference to Mosby’s painstaking efforts to facilitate his
army’s raids on Washington, D.C., Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, and subsequent Valley
operations. He instead adhered to doctrinally accepted Napoleonic-style tactics, as
exemplified by his actions at the Battle of Monocacy (July 9, 1864), in which he
maneuvered tightly massed regiments like chess pieces on open battlefields. Mosby’s
late mentor, JEB Stuart, had previously tasked Mosby to function as the Army of
Northern Virginia’s eyes and ears, and to destroy railroads and supply lines behind
Union lines in conjunction with Lee’s operations. In contrast, Early excluded Mosby
from planning; sent him no written orders; and expressed apathy toward present and
former Partisan Rangers mustered into his command.121 After Stuart was mortally
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wounded at Yellow Tavern on May 11, Mosby reported directly to Lee. When Lee
became preoccupied with Grant at Petersburg in the autumn of 1864, Mosby logically
expected to cooperate with Early as he had with Stuart. Mosby later contrasted Lee and
Stuart’s professionalism with Early’s unresponsiveness:
Gen. Lee and Stuart always sent me written instructions, even by my own
most trusted Lieutenants…[D]uring the time that Early was in the Valley I
never at any time directly or indirectly received any message from him,
oral or written…[h]e never communicated with me.122
Early instead played to Union strengths by fighting conventionally without the proven
advantage of partisan assistance. He was in no position to be persnickety, but
squandered a key strategic enabler against superior forces. Although Mosby was
sidelined in September by a combat wound during Winchester and Fisher’s Hill, his
cooperation at Cedar Creek in October could have created greater opportunities for
southern success.123 His Rangers had a well-deserved reputation as one of the elite
Confederate units.124 Their tactical élan and psychological dominance over the invaders
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was well established. One of Sheridan’s best cavalry commanders admitted that “[t]he
guerillas, being few in numbers, mounted on fleet horses and thoroughly conversant
with the country, had every advantage over my men.”125 Early’s unwillingness to
leverage the Rangers is explainable by his lack of experience in independent command
and the political climate.
Early reflected prevailing politics. The Confederate Government chose a
conventional strategy in 1864 in the hope that a strategic defensive was sufficient to
maintain military stalemates in Richmond and Atlanta. Continued stalemate would
theoretically increase northern war weariness, and thereby influence northern voters to
elect the Democratic Presidential Candidate George B. McClellan, who accepted his
party’s “peace” platform in September.126 President Davis and other West Pointers had
originally envisioned a strategy defined by conventional battles in the hope of gaining
Confederate international legitimacy. However, the reality of Union-occupied territory,
vast material inferiority, and the desire to control an alarming number of unauthorized
guerilla bands compelled the Confederate adoption of a hybrid strategy in 1862. The
War Department passed the Partisan Ranger Act on April 21, 1862, which authorized
officers to independently raise Partisan Ranger commands from volunteers who lived
among family and friends; operate behind enemy lines; and to arm and equip themselves
with captured supplies. Despite the Partisan Act’s passage, Confederate Secretary of
War James Randolph remained unified with the West Point-dominated establishment in
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opposition to partisan warfare. The establishment basically perceived partisans as pirates
who undermined conventional forces by encouraging regulars to desert to more
attractive undisciplined guerilla units who plundered. Davis and Randolph therefore
deliberately implemented the first Confederate Conscription Act on April 16, 1862, five
days prior to the Partisan Ranger Act, to promote conventional warfare over guerilla
warfare. Randolph also restricted guerilla recruitment by including the provision in the
Partisan Act that Partisan Ranger unit creation required departmental commander
approval; and General Orders no. 53, which prohibited further Partisan Ranger
recruitment after July 31, 1862. Lee occasionally circumvented Confederate red tape by
allowing the formation of legitimate guerilla units like Mosby’s, with the understanding
that Rangers would remain under his control.127
American Revolutionary armies augmented by irregular militia had become
unpopular with the West Point antebellum officer corps schooled in Napoleon Bonaparte
and Henri Jomini. Historian William B. Skelton asserts that the Confederate War
Department’s conventional mindset reflected the officer corps’ antebellum
professionalization. Stuart had valued the Ranger’s contributions as Mosby’s mentor and
ally. However, he was also a West Pointer who was fully cognizant that his cohorts
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would negatively perceive Mosby’s unit. When Mosby was promoted to Captain and
awarded with an independent command in March 1863, Stuart cautioned him to:
[B]y all means ignore the term “Partizan Ranger.” It is in bad repute. Call
your command “Mosby’s Regulars,” and it will give it a tone of meaning
and solid worth…You will have to be very much on your guard against
incorporating in your command deserters from other branches of the
service.128
Mosby idolized Stuart, but realized that “spoils” were a prime recruitment incentive, and
defiantly referred to his unit as Partisan Rangers. He was authorized to operate
asymmetrically on detached duty but required to wear regular uniforms and follow
Stuart and Lee’s orders and army regulations. Previous units had given Partisan Rangers
a bad image. Throughout 1862, the Confederate Government received complaints of
regular soldier desertion to irregular units, as well as angry complaints from civilians in
Missouri, Tennessee, and North Carolina who had allegedly been terrorized and
plundered by Confederate “bushwhackers” like William Quantrill and Bill Anderson.
“Bushwhackers” were home-grown, civilian-clad, self-constituted guerillas known for
their atrocities.129 Historian James McPherson points out that Quantrill’s raid on
Lawrence, Kansas, in which Missouri “Rangers” killed 150 people and destroyed an
abolitionist stronghold in August 1863, created a public uproar that “gave all guerillas a

128

William B. Skelton, An American Profession of Arms: The Army Officer Corps,
1784-1861 (Lawrence: The University of Kansas Press: 1992), 87-88, 125-130, 210-212,
246-247, 261, 295-301; John S. Mosby, Mosby’s War Reminiscences and Stuart’s
Cavalry Campaigns, 1887 (New York: Pageant Book Co, 1958) 11, 39; Stuart to Mosby,
March 25, 1863, The Letters of John S. Mosby, 31-32; Mosby, Memoirs, chapter 2, 168188.
129
Andrew J. Birtle, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations
Doctrine 1860-1941 (Washington: Center of Military History, 1998), 23-26.

81
bushwhacker image.”130 Mosby and McNeill’s units maintained excellent reputations in
spite of the bad press. Lee and Stuart had always coordinated with Mosby and had given
him clear instructions because they recognized that he was a combat multiplier. Early
was altogether different. Mosby was compelled to “guess” at Early’s intentions to
facilitate his army’s strategy without any clear guidance.131 Early therefore failed to fully
utilize a powerful asset against a superior foe.
Sheridan meant business. Early’s Washington and Chambersburg raids had
created the public furor necessary for Grant to formulate an aggressive Valley strategy.
Halleck consolidated the formerly disparate military departments of Washington,
Maryland, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia into the Middle Military Division at Grant’s
suggestion. Grant put Sheridan in command of the Middle Military Division, who
immediately organized the mobile 45,000-man Army of the Shenandoah to accomplish
the task of clearing the Valley of all enemy forces and “forage and subsistence” to
render it “untenable.” Grant was confident in Sheridan’s ability to execute a “hard war”
strategy that denied Lee the Valley’s resources, and to follow Early “to the death.”132
Historian Mark Grimsley points out that over the course of the war, Lincoln effectively
shifted from a “conciliatory” policy (1861) that respected southern Constitutional rights,
to a “hard war” policy meant “to demoralize southern civilians” and destroy the
Confederate economy. Former Union General-in-Chief Henry W. Halleck had vacillated
on counterinsurgency policy by allowing department commanders to handle guerillas
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with varied severity. Grant finally refined and incorporated those existing policies into
his overall strategy.133 Sheridan took command on August 6th and began planning the
Army of the Valley’s destruction, but he never formulated an effective solution to the
guerilla problem. Mosby’s Berryville Wagon Raid on August 13 inaugurated sustained
Ranger operations against Sheridan’s supply lines and detachments that continued
indefinitely. After Berryville, Sheridan set the tone by following orders to hang Rangers
without trial, arrest their families, and “destroy and carry off the crops, animals, negroes,
and all men under fifty years of age capable of bearing arms.”134 Not until Sheridan
decisively defeated Early, however, did he make a concerted effort against the guerillas.
Early would have benefited from acknowledging that despite Sheridan’s best counterguerilla measures, the 43rd Ranger Battalion continued to grow and maintain the tactical
initiative.135 He instead effectively ignored Mosby’s locally rooted, thriving, wellorganized, and available guerilla force that literally surrounded him.
Mosby’s 43rd Virginia Cavalry Battalion consisted of roughly 800 hand-picked
cavalrymen who dominated the area of Northern Virginia known as “Mosby’s
Confederacy.” Mosby’s Confederacy (see Figure 4b) was the region around Loudon,
Fauquier, Fairfax, and Prince William Counties, which included the Bull Run and Blue
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Ridge Mountains, and the adjacent lower Shenandoah Valley. His Rangers’ sustained
raids on enemy outposts, pickets, couriers, detachments, supply lines, and patrols created
a corrosive environment that destabilized the Union occupation. Historian James
Ramage asserts that “the night belonged to Mosby” in Northern Virginia because his
raids created fear in soldiers’ minds as a force multiplier, and compelled Union
commanders to inordinately detail soldiers from front-line service to logistical and rear
area security, as well as counter-guerilla operations.136 Mosby defined his own
operational concept:
My purpose was to weaken the armies invading Northern Virginia, by
harassing their rear. As a line is only as strong as its weakest point, it was
necessary for it to be stronger than I was at every point, in order to resist
my attacks…To destroy supply trains, to break up the means of conveying
intelligence, and thus isolating an army from its base, as well as its
different corps from each other, to confuse their plans by capturing
despatches, are the objects of partisan war…My men had no camps. If
they had gone into camp, they would soon have all been captured. They
would scatter for safety, and gather at my call, like the Children of the
Mist.137
Herman Melville rode with the Union cavalry at Aldie in April 1863. His description of
the Rangers’ terrible presence among the hostile population corroborates Mao’s
assertion that the civilian population is “the sea in which the insurgent swims:”
Unarmed none cared to stir abroad
For berries beyond their forest-fence:
As glides in seas the shark,
Rides Mosby through Green dark 138
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Southerners contrastingly lauded Rangers as heroic symbols of defiance as Federal
incursions forged Confederate identity and nationalism. Union scorched earth tactics
alienated civilians, who in turn sheltered, fed, equipped, informed, and augmented the
Ranger Battalion. Mosby’s Rangers leveraged equestrian and marksmanship expertise,
intimate knowledge of the mountains, night attacks, and the element of surprise to offset
numerical inferiority. Civilians among the hills and dales constituted the shadow support
network from which the Rangers harassed, attacked, and gobbled up isolated
detachments and stragglers before eluding superior forces.139 Rangers infested the Bull
Run and Blue Ridge Mountains like sharks who emerged from a hostile abyss to strike
and quickly carry away terrified victims without a trace.
The Rangers’ reputation for invincibility added to their mystique. Mosby had
gained renown as Stuart’s scout in 1862. However, his thirty-man raid at Fairfax
Courthouse on March 9, 1863 that bagged Brigadier General Edwin H. Stoughton
established his partisan career.140 After being rewarded with an independent command,
his Rangers became famous for destroying larger Federal Cavalry detachments who
brought sabers to gun fights. Mosby reflected that he “was the first cavalry commander
who discarded the saber as useless…my command reached the highest point of
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efficiency as cavalry because they were well armed with two six-shooters and their
charges combined the effect of fire and shock.” The Rangers proved more than a match
for Federal Cavalry man-for-man. At Chantilly in March 1863, for example, Mosby’s
fifty-man detachment rode through and destroyed a 200-man Federal Cavalry column
with a rapid and high volume of six-shot, single action, .44 caliber Army Colt revolver
fire (see Figure 4c) with no loss of Ranger life. Mosby’s engagement at Miskel’s Farm
on April 2, 1863 further established his tactical dominance. Union observers from across
the Potomac were shocked when they witnessed Mosby’s force of seventy surrounded
guerillas gain fire superiority, empty two dozen saddles, and capture eighty prisoners
and 100 fully equipped horses from the “elite” 150-man First Vermont cavalry troop.
Mosby’s aggressive combination of covert raids and small pitched battles like Chantilly
and Miskel’s Farm elicited the Staunton Speculator’s report that Mosby “had lately been
stirring up the Yankees with a sharp stick,” and earned Mosby the respect of Stuart, Lee,
and the Confederate people. Lee increasingly realized Mosby’s potential, and
enthusiastically authorized his creation of the 43rd Cavalry Battalion when he derailed
an Orange and Alexandria (O & A) Railroad train on May 30, 1863. If Early never
acknowledged Mosby’s talent, Sheridan certainly did.141
Early “lacked [both] the courage of his [own] convictions” and any appreciation
for the Ranger’s potential. Mosby wrote after the war that “I had always to guess at what
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he [Early] wanted me to do-that he never once ordered or requested me to do
anything.”142 Like any good officer, in 1864 Mosby took initiative in the absence of
Early’s clear guidance or coordination. After “moving his command “east of the Blue
Ridge for the purpose of cooperating” with Early, Mosby created a diversion at Point of
Rocks on the Potomac River with 250 Rangers that allowed Early to invade Maryland
downstream without incident on July 4, 1864. He then severed the Federal Railroad and
telegraph lines between Washington and Harper’s Ferry to facilitate Early’s subsequent
investment of Maryland Heights. Because Mosby was physically unable to reach Early
in Maryland to receive oral instructions, he temporarily resumed operations in Virginia
as the Army of the Valley raided toward Washington.
Mosby’s victory over Major William H. Forbes’ elite 150-man Federal cavalry
detachment at Mount Zion Church in a pitched battle reinforced the superiority of the
pistol over the saber, ended Federal patrols around Aldie for several weeks, and
temporarily restricted Federal columns to the main roads within Mosby’s
Confederacy.143 Without any commendations or clear instructions, Mosby continued to
attempt to cooperate with Early before and after Sheridan’s Valley offensive began on
August 10, 1864.144 Detached and denied strategic integration, Mosby waged a private
war against Sheridan:
The main object of my campaign was to vex and embarrass Sheridan and,
if possible, to prevent his advance into the interior of the state. But my
exclusive attention was not given to Sheridan, for alarm was kept up
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continuously by threatening Washington and occasionally crossing the
Potomac.145
Mosby certainly vexed Sheridan, but his admission that his “exclusive attention was not
given to Sheridan” indicates the extent to which his operations lacked coordination with
conventional military leaders. Sheridan confessed that Mosby was the “most
redoubtable” guerilla leader because he “depleted [Sheridan’s] line-of-battle strength
[by] necessitating…large escorts for…[his] supply-trains,” but imagine if the raids had
been coordinated.146 Although Mosby was absent from a combat wound between
September 13th and 29th, his subordinate commanders were proven leaders who routinely
conducted raids independently. In Mosby’s absence, Early could have easily cooperated
with Captain Sam Chapman, who was a skilled tactician and Mosby’s second-incommand. The fact that the Rangers momentarily floundered without Mosby was no
reason for Early to write them off.147 Early or one of his subordinate commanders could
certainly have taken charge of the Rangers without Mosby, and focused their
unconventional combat power on Sheridan’s rear at either Winchester or Fisher’s Hill.
The Rangers demonstrated their destructive potential in no uncertain terms at
Berryville. The Berryville Wagon Raid was Mosby’s signature asymmetric ambush.
Sheridan began maneuvering a 35,000-man army from Harper’s Ferry to destroy Early’s
Confederate Army located near Winchester on August 10. Mosby’s scouts under John
Russell apprised him of Sheridan’s disposition and long supply train that stretched from
Washington through Berryville to his army. With fresh intelligence, Mosby initiated the
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movement of three cavalry squadrons (troops in today’s language) to a temporary secret
rendezvous position near Berryville. Mosby then personally scouted the Berryville Pike
(modern-day Highway 7) just north of Berryville to select his ambush site and the
“knoll” that became the assault position. He retrieved his Rangers in the early morning
hours, led them on a concealed route toward the ambush site, and arrayed them
undetected in their assault positions. He assigned Captain Adolphus (“Dolly”) Richards’
squadron to attack the convoy where it entered Berryville; while Captains Sam Chapman
and Alfred Glasscock’s squadrons were tasked to attack the rear. As the soldiers,
teamsters, and sutlers rested, made coffee, and slowly rose to the dawn twilight around
their wagons, Mosby personally scouted and surmised the vulnerability of the strung-out
and unsecured rear of the convoy along the pike.
Mosby and his subordinate commanders positively identified their targets and
confirmed the feasibility of the attack. Satisfied, and with his squadrons set in their
assault positions, Mosby personally initiated the ambush with the signal of three
howitzer shots into the convoy. His Rangers were shrouded by mist and therefore
completely surprised the enemy (See Figure 4d). In characteristic fashion, Mosby’s 250to-300 Rangers “dashed forward ‘as reapers descend to the harvest of death’ with pistols
and ‘demoniac yells.’” Union Brigadier General John R. Kenley, who commanded the
3,000-man escort brigade and convoy, recognized the danger too late to deploy, and a
large portion of his terrified men were routed as Rangers rode through the clustered
wagons as the sun rose. Kenly’s men panicked and fled as the Rangers quickly
“unhitch[ed] mules, burn[ed] wagons, and hurr[ied] prisoners and spoils to the rear.”
Then, as quickly as they had appeared, Mosby’s skirmishers executed a rear-guard
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action to cover the Rangers’ retreat across the Shenandoah River. With the loss of only
“two dead and three wounded,” Mosby’s men killed six and wounded nine men, and
escaped through Snicker’s Gap with 200 prisoners, 420 mules, 200 cattle, and 36
horses.148 Mosby was the guerilla par excellence, and Berryville was his asymmetric
masterpiece.
Mosby dealt Sheridan a political bloody nose at Berryville that reinvigorated
Confederate morale. Although his raid was comparatively small, Sheridan could illafford embarrassments in the politically hostile context of the upcoming presidential
election. Momentum had been with the North when Grant began the Overland
Campaign, but Democratic Presidential Candidate George McClellan increasingly
appealed to northerners disheartened by Grant’s failure to destroy Lee outside
Richmond, and Sherman’s apparent stalemate at Atlanta. As Lincoln’s arch-nemesis,
McClellan grudgingly took charge of both “War Democrats” and “Peace Democrats”
known as “copperheads.” Copperhead politicians and editorialists who routinely made
capital of Union failures had a field day with Berryville.149 Major newspapers
embellished reports of the panic-stricken guards who threw down their weapons, and
even falsely claimed that the Rangers had caused Sheridan’s subsequent retrograde
movement north to Halltown.150 Harper’s Weekly inaccurately reported that:
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In the Valley Early has been quite heavily reinforced by General
Longstreet, and has taken a strong position south of Strasburg. This,
together with a partial defeat at Berryville on the 14th, in which Sheridan’s
wagon train was as completely destroyed as to embarrass his operations,
has led the latter to fall back upon Winchester.151
The New York Times played into Mosby’s hands by calling him “the only aggressive
enemy in the Military Division.”152 Mosby’s sensationalized cost-efficient raid
embarrassed and frustrated Sheridan’s efforts, demoralized his army, and encouraged
northern political opposition. Gideon Welles, Lincoln’s Secretary of the Navy, lamented
in late August that the “fault finding which has disgraced the presses ostensibly of the
administration party, particularly the press of New York has given strength to their
opponents.” The Rangers’ spectacularly lop-sided success was conversely a boon to
southern morale that was sensationalized by the southern press.153 The humiliated
Sheridan reacted with severity.
Although economical, Mosby’s attacks provoked the Army of the Shenandoah’s
wrath. His Rangers at Berryville had temporarily discredited Sheridan and tied down
three times their number of Union soldiers. Sheridan permanently tasked an 1,800-man
brigade to perform convoy security, and required that couriers be escorted by eight-toten cavalrymen. He later described the challenge posed by guerillas:
During the entire campaign, I had been annoyed by guerilla bands…and
this had considerably depleted my line-of-battle strength, necessitating as
it did large escorts…The most redoubtable of these leaders was
Mosby…154
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Mosby had penetrated Sheridan’s psyche and germinated apprehension about his supply
lines’ vulnerability within the Valley. Sheridan responded with more aggressive counterguerilla measures than any previous commander. He dedicated a company of scouts
under the Indian fighter Captain Richard Blazer to conduct hunter-killer patrols
exclusively for Rangers. His large cavalry corps also allowed him to task a large force to
screen his army, with special instructions to surveille the Blue Ridge gaps and the
Shenandoah River fords that were known Ranger ratlines. He additionally ordered the
arrest of Rangers’ family members, and condoned his subordinates’ summary execution
of captured guerillas.155 Sheridan’s counter-guerilla operations damaged the 43rd
Battalion and kept Mosby on his toes, but ultimately neither prevented raids, or
eliminated the guerilla menace. Mosby’s Rangers under Captain Chapman sustained
operations as Mosby convalesced, and by October Mosby was again leading the
battalion in aggressive operations against Sheridan’s rear.156
Sheridan no longer perceived Early as a major threat after his Winchester and
Fisher’s Hill victories virtually destroyed the Army of the Valley. His guerilla woes
continued, however. The Rangers’ renewed railroad destruction was the only bright spot
in the Valley campaign for Lee. Mosby’s spectacular raids on the Manassas Gap
(October 6) and Baltimore and Ohio (October 13) Railroads were stark reminders to
Grant and Sheridan that the Valley had yet to be conquered. Despite Sheridan’s best
efforts, the Rangers ensured that the Manassas Gap Railroad would never be utilized by
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the Army of the Shenandoah for any offensive.157 Sheridan therefore remained
obstinately opposed to Grant’s suggestion that he ascend the Valley, destroy the Virginia
Central Railroad, attack Charlottesville, and threaten Lee’s rear. Grant believed that such
an offensive would break the Richmond stalemate and shorten the war. Sheridan was not
opposed to Grant’s suggestion because of Early’s army, but the threat of guerillas to his
supply lines! Sheridan reported to Grant that although “Early’s army was completely
broken up and dispirited…, [i]t [would] be exceedingly difficult for [him] to carry the
infantry column over the mountains and strike at the Central road. [He] [could not]
accumulate sufficient stores to do so…” In Sheridan’s mind, his own victories on the
heels of Sherman’s Atlanta conquest (September 2) were sufficient to ensure Lincoln’s
reelection. Averse to further risks, he therefore determined that his two victories and
scorched-earth campaign from Staunton to Winchester were good enough for
government work. He furthermore wanted no part of a renewed campaign in which
guerillas might prevent the success of an assault on Charlottesville by weakening his
army. Sheridan thus remained stubbornly determined to let well enough alone by
remaining in the lower Valley and returning part of his army to Grant.158
Major General Early meanwhile typified the adage that “you cannot expect a
tiger to change his stripes.” Lee again reinforced Early to 21,000 men after he had nearly
lost his entire army. He had faced such odds before, and was not about to change tactics.
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Mosby was back in the saddle, aggressively campaigning, and willing “to follow orders”
as Early prepared to attack Sheridan in October. Early predictably told Mosby nothing of
his plans. The Army of the Valley’s well-executed Cedar Creek attack unfolded without
a hitch on October 19 as Major General John Brown Gordon’s strike force completely
surprised, flanked, and routed two of Sheridan’s corps around 5:30 am. When Early
halted the Confederate pursuit of Sheridan’s apparently defeated army, few could have
predicted what would happen next. There were no significant guerilla detachments in the
Valley between Sheridan’s routed army and Winchester. After all, nobody had informed
Mosby, the last significant Partisan Ranger commander, of Early’s plans. If any Rangers
were in the vicinity, they obviously failed to notice a splendidly mounted two-star
general who was riding furiously toward the battlefield and cursing a blue streak—
ordering his panicked Bluecoats to face about, fall in, and pursue the enemy. Sheridan’s
leadership electrified his army, which subsequently counterattacked and destroyed
Early’s army that afternoon once and for all. The Confederate government’s
conventional mindset and Early’s inability or unwillingness to embrace hybrid warfare
ensured that Mosby’s elite Rangers were everywhere but in the rear of Sheridan’s army
at one of the Civil War’s most critical junctures. Early refused to focus the Ranger’s
combat power on Sheridan’s Achilles heel, because “By God, [he] wasn’t going to do all
the fighting while Mosby did the plundering.” The Rangers never gobbled up Sheridan.
Instead they were all over Northern Virginia because an inept, conventionally minded
general refused to coordinate with them or to lead them.159

159

Scott, Partisan Life, 298-305, 381-390; Mosby to Bowen, July 25, 1898, and July 12
[no year], Bowen Papers; Gordon, Reminiscences, 352-372; Sheridan, Memoirs, 328336; Unknown, “From Hagerstown,” Evening Star, November 19, 1864, Historic

94
Mosby had always waged a political war to simply justify his existence. He and
McNeill were the lone exceptions to President Davis’ euphemistic reflection that
Partisan Rangers who he initially commissioned were “subsequently confined to cavalry
alone.”160 West Pointer Brigadier General Thomas L. Rosser was Early’s brave and dull
cavalry commander. He disliked guerillas because Ranger Hanse McNeill and former
Ranger Colonel Lige White had both refused to comply with some of his petulant
demands and unreasonable orders.161 Rosser had sent Lee an angry letter in January
1864 calling “Partisan Rangers” inefficient, detrimental to good order and discipline,
and a menace to civilians that provoked Union wrath. Apart from Mosby and McNeill,
Lee and Secretary of War Seddon agreed, and pressured Congress to repeal the Partisan
Ranger Act in February 1864. Lee appreciated Mosby and McNeill, but was himself a
proponent of Napoleon-style heavy battalions, and never acknowledged the value of
Ranger small unit operations characterized by 20-to-100 men for purposes of speed,
stealth, secrecy, infiltration, and surprise. Stuart praised Mosby’s exploits and vouched
for the Rangers’ “efficiency” to shield Mosby’s command, but he was also
unsympathetic to small unit operations, and had even attempted to muster Mosby’s
command into regular service at Lee’s request. Lee and Stuart had believed that they
were doing Mosby and McNeill favors; as West Pointers they were oblivious to the
importance of spoils and small unit operations to Ranger cohesion and efficiency. Lee
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had sent a letter to Stuart in response to rumors of Mosby’s men profiteering from
plunder. He professed knowledge of Mosby’s large command, but could not fathom why
Mosby “under[took] his expeditions with so few men, whether it is from policy or the
difficulty of collecting them.” Mosby and McNeill ultimately protected their commands
by traveling to Richmond to secure policy exemptions.162 In the wake of the political
bloodbath and repeated invasions, Mosby’s “battalion of six companies was the only
authorized [guerilla] force operating in the rear of Sheridan’s army in the Shenandoah
Valley” by the fall of 1864.163
Ranger operations the week after Cedar Creek bore testimony to Mosby’s
deferred dream and capability to influence Early’s campaign. After the battle, Mosby
approached one of Early’s staff members in Charlottesville to ask why Early had not
notified him of his plans to attack Sheridan at Cedar Creek. Mosby told the staff officer
that he “could have struck him [Sheridan] in the rear-destroyed his trains in the rout &
confusion-& probably created such a [ferment?] that they could not-have reformed…”164
He was not exaggerating. After Cedar Creek, Mosby and 400 Rangers infiltrated the
Valley on the night of October 24th, and successfully attacked another wagon train six
miles north of Winchester on the 25th. The Rangers captured Union General Alfred
N.A. Duffie during the ambush. While Sheridan downplayed the incident, continued
battalion-sized Ranger raids in the Bull Run and Shenandoah Valleys only reinforced his
refusal to shorten the war by attacking Charlottesville. In addition to numerous
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unauthorized guerilla units throughout the Valley, by December 1864 the 43rd Battalion
grew to eight companies. Mosby demonstrated that Early’s refusal to coordinate with the
Rangers and enlist their help to influence the Cedar Creek battle was a grievous error.165
His failure to follow Stuart and Breckinridge’s example of employing the full spectrum
of available forces might have cost him the most decisive battle of the Valley Campaign.
Mosby intentionally understated the case when he reflected that Early “preferred for
Sheridan to keep his wagon trains.”166
Mosby defied political and military odds with remarkable success. He
transcended conventional tactics and re-discovered guerilla principles as old as warfare
itself by striving for excellence. As an outsider to the West Point clique, his
unconventional rise as a partisan chieftain was perceived as a threat by the jealous and
small-minded elements of the elitist Confederate power structure who were dedicated to
maintaining the status quo. Stuart was a true ally who recognized Mosby’s potential and
enabled his success. By running with opportunities, Mosby’s Rangers became a force
multiplier that ultimately earned the respect and admiration of Stuart, Lee, and the
Confederate people. Mosby and McNeill managed to save their commands from jealous
elites through proven good conduct and efficiency. Following Stuart’s death and Lee’s
increasingly desperate situation between the summer to the winter of 1864, Mosby’s
operational lines of effort became largely detached from the strategic situation. As
Union offensives ground down the Confederate Army, less experienced commanders
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lacked the imagination and strategic acumen of men like Stuart. Early’s monolithic
devotion to conventional warfare ensured that Mosby’s command would become
disengaged as a strategic enabler. Early imprudently dealt the Rangers out of his crucial
Valley operations. He thereby quickened his defeat at Cedar Creek by ignoring available
unconventional forces capable of creating military opportunities. Sheridan’s victory over
Early and brutal Valley suppression paradoxically stoked the flames of Mosby’s
command, which eluded occupiers and executed raids indefinitely. Following the Army
of the Valley’s destruction, only the Rangers prevented Sheridan from taking
Charlottesville from the Valley. Mosby mastered asymmetric warfare and delayed
Union victory, but his efforts were in vain “without a good army to take advantage of
[his] success.”167
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Figure 4a:168

The Shenandoah Valley and Mosby’s Confederacy

Figure 4b:169

Mosby’s Confederacy Proper
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Figure 4c:170
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Conclusion
Marion and Mosby’s combat power stemmed from their ability to adapt guerilla
principles to regional cultural, political, and socioeconomic conditions. As material
underdogs, they achieved asymmetric mastery by leveraging local resources and
mounted guerilla tactics against larger, better-equipped adversaries. Civilian
communities who viewed them as resistance symbols provided the essential support
structure for their success as enemy occupations forged nationalism. Their fluid forces
thrived among the swamps, mountains, and sympathetic populace who provided them
refuge, food, supplies, intelligence, and manpower. They won popular support with
dedication, political savvy, tactical skill, and economy of force. Marion and Mosby
adhered to ancient principles used by Genghis Khan and Shun Tzu. They avoided
superior forces and enemy strongpoints in favor of isolated units and weak points. They
targeted military infrastructure, supply convoys, isolated troop detachments, pickets,
couriers, and elements of the population who supported the enemy. Their attacks
weakened larger armies by logistically disrupting supply and communication; corroding
enemy troop morale and domestic war support; and diverting enemies’ line-of-battle
strength by compelling them to protect supply lines, outposts, and detachments. As
efficient partisans, their political and informational impacts created irrational fear in
their enemies’ minds, and were sensationalized by soldiers, politicians, and the print
media. They became exponentially more effective than comparably sized regular units
by exploiting their own legends and psychologically dominating their enemies by using
fear as a force multiplier. While objective historians acknowledge their proficiency,
Mosby’s legend was tainted by the slave power defeat and association with Confederate
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bushwhackers. Marion became a hero as his militia was incorporated into a winning
strategy. Mosby’s 1864 operations contrastingly remained a bright spot in Virginia’s
dismal war effort, partly because his Rangers’ spirit represented something more
American than Richmond’s elite establishment.
The divergence of Confederate ideology and goals from original American
republican-based values shaped Richmond’s political and military policies. The
Southern Campaign of the American Revolution had been part of a radical movement
with a democratic groundswell of citizen-militia support for the Patriot cause. Greene
achieved victory in the South not from his Continentals’ strength, but by designing and
directing a salient hybrid strategy that channeled the power of a people’s war. He
overcame superior numbers by incorporating partisans like Marion, who knew the
terrain and had earned the people’s loyalty, into a hybrid strategy that systematically
incorporated guerilla tactics. President Davis’ Confederate War Department had a
different political philosophy and strategic vision. The Richmond elite sought to
preserve slavery and the social order by promoting a deferential society that suppressed
political parties, and protected southern institutions and infrastructure with a
conventional army. Elite-driven conscription created a grand professional army and
tactics that limited guerilla warfare’s potential to create anarchy. In the balance,
Confederate tactics were never grand enough to cope with Union advantages, so
partisans like Mosby and McNeill coped by irregular means.
Mosby, like Marion, was an underdog who became Virginia’s master of partisan
warfare. Yet Marion had more significantly influenced the Southern Campaign. Greene
integrated him into the overall strategy by providing written orders, a sense of purpose,
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and by nesting his partisan raids into overall strategy. Coordinated actions allowed
Marion’s ambush of Major Robert McLeroth at Halfway Swamp on December 12, 1780
to create a power shift which denied Cornwallis his military base-of-support,
reinvigorated Greene’s, and thereby facilitated Continental victory. In 1863, Mosby was
rewarded with a command after proving guerilla warfare’s feasibility, despite
technological advancements and military professionalization. Lee and Stuart utilized his
Rangers much like Greene had Marion. As the Spring 1864 Union offensive removed
competent southern leaders, commanders like Early steeped in West Point doctrine were
loath to embrace hybrid warfare, even when all other options were exhausted. As
Northern Virginia’s last officially sanctioned partisan leader, Mosby not only proved his
capability to cooperate at Berryville on August 13, 1864, but even prolonged the war by
influencing Sheridan not to advance through the Shenandoah Valley to attack the
strategically vital Charlottesville rail hub behind Lee’s army. Unlike Greene, Early
chose not to coordinate with Mosby and avoided hybrid warfare, apparently because of
his overinflated elitist sense of pride, as well as inexperience and incompetence. Early’s
irrational refusal to employ Mosby indicates that oligarchic Confederate elitism under
the stress of war created strategic inflexibility that resulted in catastrophes like Cedar
Creek, a factor in southern defeat.
Marion was a revolutionary hero in a war that democratically embraced grassroots support; Mosby was an indominable American who became a controversial figure
in a slave society’s failed independence movement. While Stuart lived and the Army of
Northern Virginia maneuvered, Mosby made important strategic contributions. The peak
strength and efficiency of the Rangers tragically coincided with Stuart’s death and Lee’

103
hopeless defense of Richmond. In contrast to Greene, Early’s Army of the Valley
command team substituted arrogance for inferiority. Early foolishly shuffled the
Rangers, his last ace, out of his deck. Like Marion, Mosby only needed broad guidance
and written orders delivered by a trusted courier to coordinate his actions, which Early
obviously knew. Mosby was on the losing side, and defeat shaped his contentious
historiography. Recent scholarship, however, testifies to his legacy as a high-caliber
guerilla like Marion. Both demonstrated that the ancient art of guerilla warfare will
always remain a viable strategic option for weaker nations under the right circumstances,
terrain, conditions, and with the right people. Mosby was a true partisan whose impact
was limited by the constraints of oligarchic leadership whose narrow interests set the
political agenda and defined a bridle, inflexible strategy. As Marion demonstrated,
however, no military on earth is sufficiently powerful to suppress a truly democratic
movement and a real people’s war.
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